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What  Does Monetary  Policy Do? 
THERE  IS  A  long tradition in monetary  economics of searching for a 
single policy variable-perhaps a monetary  aggregate, perhaps  an in- 
terest rate-that  is more or less controlled  by policy and stably related 
to economic activity. Whether  the variable  is conceived of as an indi- 
cator of policy or a measure  of policy stance, correlations  between the 
variable  and macroeconomic  time series are taken  to reflect the effects 
of monetary  policy. Conditions  for the existence of such a variable  are 
stringent. Essentially, policy choices must evolve autonomously, in- 
dependent  of economic conditions. Even the harshest  critics of mone- 
tary authorities  would not maintain  that policy decisions are unrelated 
to the economy. In this paper  we extend a line of work that  builds on a 
venerable economic tradition to emphasize the need to specify and 
estimate  behavioral  relationships  for  policy. The  estimated  relationships 
separate  the regular response of policy to the economy from the re- 
sponse of the economy to policy, producing  a more accurate  measure 
of the effects of policy changes. 
The views expressed  here are not necessarily  those of the Board  of Governors  of the 
Federal  Reserve  System  or the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Atlanta.  The authors  would like 
to acknowledge  what they have learned  about the implementation  of monetary  policy 
from conversations  with Lois Berthaume,  Will Roberds, and Mary Rosenbaum  of the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Atlanta,  Charles  Steindel  of the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New 
York, Marvin  Goodfriend  of the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Richmond,  and  Sheila  Tschin- 
kel. David Petersen  of the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Atlanta  helped  both in locating  data 
and in discussing  the operation  of the money markets. 
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One  sometimes  encounters  the presumption that models  for policy 
analysis  and those for forecasting  are sharply distinct: a model that is 
useful  for policy  choice  need not fit the data well,  and well-fit  models 
necessarily  sacrifice  economic  interpretability.  We  do  not  share this 
presumption and aim to show that it is possible  to construct economi- 
cally  interpretable models  with superior fit to the data. 
As the recent empirical  literature on the effects  of monetary policy 
has developed  ways of handling more complex,  multivariate data sets, 
a variety of new models and approaches has emerged. Researchers have 
chosen  different  data sets,  made different assumptions,  and tended to 
emphasize  the  differences  between  their results  and those  of  others, 
rather than the commonalities.  This paper uses a single time frame and 
data set to check the robustness of results in the literature and to trace 
the nature and sources of the differences  in conclusions. 
We analyze and interpret the data without imposing strong economic 
beliefs.  The methods that we employ  permit estimation  of large time- 
series  models  and thus more comprehensive  analysis  of the data. The 
models  integrate policy  behavior  variously  with  the banking system, 
with demand for a broad monetary aggregate,  and with a rich array of 
goods  and financial market variables to provide a fuller understanding 
of the mechanism of monetary transmission.  The combination of weak 
economic  assumptions  and large models  reveals  difficulties  of  distin- 
guishing  policy  effects,  which other approaches fail to bring out. 
The size  of the effects  attributed to shifts in monetary policy  varies 
across specifications  of economic  behavior.  We show that most of the 
specifications  imply that only  a modest portion (in some cases,  essen- 
tially none) of the variance in output or prices in the United States since 
1960 can be attributed to shifts  in monetary policy.  Furthermore, we 
point  out  substantive  problems  in  the  models  that  imply  large  real 
effects  on output or prices and argue that correcting these reduces the 
implied  size  of the real effects. 
Another robust conclusion,  common  across these  models,  is that a 
large fraction  of  the variation in monetary policy  instruments can be 
attributed to the systematic  reaction of policy  authorities to the state of 
the economy.  This is what one would expect of good monetary policy, 
but it is also the reason why it is difficult to use the historical behavior 
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Method 
We use a class of models called identified vector autoregressions 
(VARs) that has only recently begun to be widely used. Nonetheless, 
much of the previous empirical research on the effects of monetary 
policy uses methods that fit within this general framework. In this 
section we describe  the framework,  summarize  how it differs  from  other 
popular frameworks, and consider some common criticisms. In the 
following section we discuss the ways in which we and  others  have put 
substantive  meat on this abstract  skeleton. 
Model Form and Identification 
Identified  vector autoregressions  break up the variation  in a list of 
time series into mutually independent  components, according to the 
following general scheme. If y(t) is a (k x  1) vector of time series, we 
write 
in 
(1)  ,  A,y(t  -  s)  =  A(L)y(t)  =  e(t), 
s=o 
where  L is a lag operator  and  the disturbance  vector  E(t)  is uncorrelated 
with y(s) for s <  t and has an identity covariance  matrix.  I We assume 
that  AO  is invertible, which guarantees  that  one can solve equation 1 to 
produce 
t-I 
(2)  y(t)  =  E  CsE(t  -  s)  +  Eoy(t). 
s=o 
The elements of Cs, treated  as functions  of s, are known  as the model's 
impulse responses because they delineate how each variable in y re- 
sponds over time to each disturbance  in E.2 
1  Note that we have omitted  any constant  terms in the system. There is no loss of 
generality  if ones admits  the possibility  that  one of the equations  takes  the form  yk(t) = 
Yk(t -  1), with no error  term, in which case Yk becomes the constant. 
2.  We write as if we were sure that a correct  model can be constructed  in the form 
of equations 1 and 2 with our list of variables. If we have omitted some important 
variable,  this assumption  may be incorrect.  A related,  but  technically  more  subtle  point 
is made  by Sargent  (1984), who notes that  it is possible for a representation  of the form 4  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
To use this mathematical  structure  for economic policy analysis, one 
has to identify it-give  its elements economic interpretations.3  The 
mathematical  model explains all variation  in the data as arising from 
the independent  disturbances,  E.  Since we are studying the effects of 
monetary  policy, we need to specify an element of the E vector, or a 
list of its elements, that represents  disturbances  to monetary  policy. 
The equation  system 1 contains one equation  for each element of the E 
vector, defining it as a function of current  and past values of y(t). So 
specifying the element or elements of E that correspond  to monetary 
policy is equivalent to specifying an equation  or set of equations  that 
characterizes  monetary  policy behavior.  These equations  can be thought 
of as describing  relations  among current  and past values of y that hold 
exactly when there are no disturbances  to policy. They are, in other 
words, policy rules or reaction  functions. The remaining  equations  of 
the system describe the nonpolicy part  of the economy, and their dis- 
turbances  are nonpolicy sources of variation  in the economy. 
While representations  of the behavior  of the y time series in the form 
of equations 1 and 2 exist under  fairly general  conditions, they are not 
unique. Models in this form with different  A and (therefore)  C coeffi- 
cients may imply exactly the same behavior of y. Because the impli- 
cations of a change in monetary  policy are determined  by A and C, this 
means that models with different  policy implications  may be indistin- 
guishable on the basis of their fit to the data. When this is true, the 
model is said to be unidentified.  The nature  of the indeterminacy  is as 
follows. Given any matrix W satisfying W'W =  I (that is, any ortho- 
normal  matrix), one can replace  E by WE, A(L) by WA(L),  and C(L) by 
(2) to exist for a list of variables  even though the corresponding  form (1) may not be 
available.  This occurs when C in equation  2 is not what  engineers  call a minimum  delay 
filter. Intuitively, it occurs when the variables  in y do not respond  quickly  enough  to E. 
While this is important,  it is really a special case of the initial  point that  one can obtain 
misleading  results  by not having the right  list of variables. 
3.  "Identify" is used in various senses in economics. Sometimes, as in this para- 
graph, an identified  model is one that has an economic interpretation,  as opposed to a 
reduced  form model that  merely summarizes  the statistical  properties  of the data. But at 
other times, a model is said to be identified  only when the data to be used in fitting it 
are informative  about its behavioral interpretation.  Often, but not always, in these 
situations, more than one behavioral  interpretation  can be given to the same reduced 
form. In this paper  we follow common  practice  by choosing the meaning,  depending  on 
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C(L)W', arriving  at a new representation  of the same form. Since the 
new version of the model is just a linear transformation  of the old, it 
implies the same time-series properties  for the data, y. Only if one 
knows enough about the form of A (or, equivalently, C) to rule out 
some transformed  WAs  or CWs as implausible or impossible can the 
data lead to the most likely form of A. 
We use three sorts of identifying restrictions  to pin down the con- 
nection between A and the implied behavior  of y. First, we use exact 
linear restrictions  on the elements of AO,  usually simply setting certain 
elements to zero. To rely entirely  on these restrictions,  one would need 
at least  k[(k  -  1)/2]  of  them,  because  a (k  x  k) orthonormal matrix 
has this many free parameters.  With this number  of restrictions  on the 
elements of AO.  the restriction equations, together with the k[(k - 
1)/2] independent  restrictions  in the W'W =  I requirement,  are suffi- 
cient in number  to make  W  unique.4  We also use probabilistic  assertions 
about elements of A-that  certain  values or relations  among values of 
elements of A are more likely than others. And third, we use informal 
restrictions  on the reasonableness  of the impulse responses, the Cs in 
equation  2. The first two types are easy to handle mathematically,  but 
the latter is not. We use it informally, in that we focus attention  on 
results  that  do not produce  implausible  impulse  responses. Our  criterion 
for plausibility is loose.  We do not expect to see strongly positive 
responses from prices, output, or monetary aggregates to monetary 
contraction, nor strongly negative responses from interest rates. Our 
informal  use of this sort  of identifying  information  may  give the impres- 
sion of undisciplined data mining. We could have accomplished the 
same, at much greater computational  cost,  by imposing our beliefs 
about the forms of impulse responses as precise mathematical  restric- 
tions, but this would not have been any more "disciplined." Our  pro- 
cedure differs from the standard  practice of empirical researchers  in 
economics  only in being less apologetic. Economists  adjust  their  models 
until they both fit the data and give  "reasonable" results. There is 
nothing  unscientific  or dishonest about  this. It would be unscientific  or 
4.  This is an  order  condition,  analogous  to that  used  for identification  in simultaneous 
equations  (SE) modeling. As in SE modeling, there  is always a possibility  that  although 
there  are  enough  equations,  they are  not independent,  so that  a rank  condition  fails while 
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dishonest  to hide results  for models  that fit much better than the one 
presented (even if the hidden model seems unreasonable),  or for models 
that fit about as well  as the one reported and support other interpreta- 
tions of the data that some readers might regard as reasonable.  We do 
nothing of this sort. 
Our approach to  identification  in this paper is  very  similar to that 
followed  in the rest of the identified VAR literature, but it differs from 
some other approaches to quantitative macroeconomics.  In some cases, 
the differences  correspond to common criticisms of the identified VAR 
approach by the advocates  of those other approaches. 
Comparisons  with Other Approaches 
Traditional  econometric  simultaneous  equations  (SE)  modeling 
works with systems  quite similar in form to those that we deal with.  It 
begins  with  a system  in the form of  equation  1, usually  with our as- 
sumption  that the  E  vector  is  uncorrelated  across  time,  and always 
without our assumption that E has an identity covariance  matrix. With 
an unrestricted Ql as a covariance matrix for E,  the mathematical struc- 
ture is subject to a wider range of transformations that leave the model's 
implications  for data unchanged.  While the identified VAR framework 
admits an arbitrary orthonormal W as a transformation matrix, the stan- 
dard SE  framework  admits  an arbitrary nonsingular  matrix  V in  the 
same role. So in order to pin down the mapping between E and the data, 
the SE approach requires stronger a priori restrictions on A. Tradition- 
ally these have taken two forms.  One is block triangularity restrictions 
on contemporaneous  interactions among variables (A, from equation  1) 
that are linked to conformable block diagonality restrictions on fQ. Such 
a combination  breaks the  variable  list  into  two  components,  usually 
labeled predetermined and endogenous,  respectively.  The second form 
of restriction adds linear constraints (again,  often simply  setting coef- 
ficients to zero) on the elements  of the rows of A corresponding to the 
endogenous  variables. 
To get a feeling  for the differences  in the requirements for identifi- 
cation between identified VARs and traditional simultaneous equations, 
it may help to consider  the simplest  model.  In a two-equation  system 
with no lags,  a single  zero restriction on A,  suffices  for identification 
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(3)  a,y,(t)  +  al2y2(t)  =  E,(t) 
a22y2(t)  =  E2(t) 
in which we have imposed the single constraint  a21 =  0, has a unique 
mapping  from A to the stochastic properties  (here, simply the covari- 
ance matrix)  of y. The y vector is implied to have a covariance  matrix 
Q  =  (AO'AO)-  i, and AO  can be found from fl  as the inverse of its unique 
upper  triangular  square  root, or Choleski decomposition. If equation  3 
is interpreted  as a traditional  simultaneous  equations  system, however, 
it is not identified-arbitrary linear  combinations  of the two equations 
satisfy all the restrictions  (since there are none) on the form of the first 
equation, while leaving the implications  of the system for the behavior 
of y unchanged.  A nonsingular  linear  transformation  of the system can 
replace  the first  equation  with a linear  combination  of the two equations, 
while leaving the second equation unchanged. An orthonormal  linear 
transformation  must change both equations  at once in order  to preserve 
the lack of correlation  between  the disturbances.  This is why the system 
is not identified  as a standard  SE model, but is identified  as our type of 
identified  VAR model. Called recursive, this kind of system is a well- 
recognized  special case in the simultaneous  equations  literature.5  In this 
two-variable  version, a single linear  restriction  on any of the four coef- 
ficients in AO,  together with the usual identified VAR restriction  that 
the es  are uncorrelated,  is equivalent to the assumption  in traditional 
SE modeling that one of the variables  in the system is predetermined. 
Impulse  responses  can be computed  for traditional  SE models as well 
as for identified VARs. In an identified VAR, though, the restriction 
that Var(E) =  I means that, in some circumstances,  conclusions about 
model behavior  are less dependent  on identifying assumptions  about  A 
than in SE models. Consider an example from the discussion below. 
One might find that the rows of C(L) that correspond  to prices and 
interest  rates (the first and second rows, say) mostly show prices and 
interest  rates moving in the same direction, when they show any sub- 
stantial movement:  c,j(s)  and c2j(s) have the same sign for most values 
of j and s when either clj(s)  or c,j(s)  is large. One might expect that the 
response to a monetary  policy shock should show the opposite sign 
pattern-c,j(s)  and C2j(S) would move in opposite  directions.  Then one 
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could conclude that monetary  policy disturbances  cannot account for 
much of the observed variation  in prices and interest  rates, regardless 
of the specific identifying  restrictions.  It is true that linear transforma- 
tions of the system will correspond  to linear transformations  of the 
disturbances.  Some linear transformations  (differences, for example) 
of  responses  that have  c,j(s)  and c2j(s)  of  the same  sign  could  easily 
show  c,j(s)  and c2j(s)  of  opposite  signs.  But orthonormal transforma- 
tions  of  responses  that all  show  large movements  of  clj(s)  and c2j(s) 
with the same sign cannot  produce  transformed  responses  that are both 
of the opposite sign and also large. In other words, if most of the 
disturbances  that produce  substantial  interest  rate responses show sub- 
stantial  price movements  in the same direction, then it is characteristic 
of the data  that these two variables  tend to move in the same direction. 
A monetary  policy disturbance,  which moves the two variables  in op- 
posite directions, cannot  then be accounting  for more than a small part 
of overall variance in interest rates. One could not reach the same 
conclusion from a traditional  SE model, because one would have to 
admit the possibility of a monetary  policy shock with large variance, 
offset by another shock that also moves prices and interest rates in 
opposite directions but is negatively correlated with the monetary 
disturbance. 
This brings  out one advantage  of insisting  that  a well-specified  model 
account  for all correlations  among  disturbances,  so that  the disturbances 
have an identity covariance matrix. When the historical record shows 
a very strong  pattern  of positive comovement  between interest  rates  and 
prices, if one believes that  monetary  policy disturbances  would  generate 
negative comovements, it is reasonable  to conclude that  monetary  pol- 
icy disturbances  have not been a major  source of variation  in the data. 
It seems strained  to insist that monetary  policy disturbances  could be 
important,  but tend to be systematically  offset by simultaneous  private 
sector disturbances.  If this is actually  the case, it raises questions  about 
the model. Do the offsetting private  sector shocks occur because of an 
effect of monetary  policy on the private  sector shocks?  If so, our model 
implies that once the full effects of a monetary  policy disturbance  are 
accounted for, it does not move interest rates and prices in opposite 
directions, which is suspicious. Do the offsetting shocks arise because 
of an effect of the private  sector on policymaking?  If so, this ought to 
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Objections  to Identified VAR  Modeling 
It is sometimes suggested that disturbances  are what is  "omitted 
from the theory," and that therefore  one cannot claim to know much 
about their properties. Note, though, that traditional  assumptions  of 
predetermination  make the same kinds of assertions about the lack of 
correlation  among sources of variation  as identified VAR models. If 
one really knows nothing  about  the stochastic  properties  of disturbance 
terms, one will not be able to distinguish  disturbances  from systematic 
components  of variation.  Furthermore,  correlation  among  disturbances 
is a serious embarrassment  when a model is actually used for policy 
analysis. If disturbances  to the monetary  policy reaction function are 
strongly correlated  with private sector disturbances,  how can one use 
the system to simulate the effects of variations  in monetary  policy? In 
practice, the usual answer  is that simulations  of the effects of paths of 
policy variables  or of hypothetical  policy rules are conducted  under  the 
assumption  that such policy changes can be made without producing 
any change in disturbance  terms in other equations, even if the esti- 
mated covariance matrix of disturbances  shows strong correlations. 
This is not logically inconsistent, but it amounts  to the claim that the 
true  policy disturbance  is that  part  of the reaction  function  residual  that 
is not correlated  with other  disturbances  in the system. This, in turn, is 
equivalent to claiming that the true reaction function is a linear com- 
bination of what the model labels the reaction function and the other 
equations  in the system whose disturbances  are correlated  with it. Our 
view is that  if one is going to do this in the end, the assumptions  on the 
model that  justify doing so should be explicit from the beginning. 
Advocates of traditional  SE models are also sometimes puzzled by 
the focus on policy shocks (the E  vector) in the identified VAR ap- 
proach. This is largely a semantic confusion. As we point out above, 
identifying  policy shocks is equivalent  to identifying  equations  for pol- 
icy reaction functions. In addition, distinguishing these shocks from 
other sources of disturbance  to the system is equivalent  to identifying 
the nonpolicy  equations  of the model, which determine  the response  of 
the system to policy actions or to changes in the policy rule. The 
prominence  of shocks in presentations  of identified  VAR results  merely 
reflects a sharp focus on the model's characteristics  as a probability 
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on the equations and treat  the rest of the stochastic structure  casually. 
Identified VAR results are often presented as tables or charts of re- 
sponses to shocks, the Cs in equation 2. But these carry exactly the 
same information  about  the model as the As in equation 1, the equation 
coefficients that are more commonly presented  in traditional  SE mod- 
eling approaches.  Presentations  of SE models also often include simu- 
lations of the model with various  kinds of perturbations.  The Cs can be 
thought of as a systematic set of simulations, of responses to a range 
of types of disturbance  that is wide enough to display all aspects of the 
model's behavior. 
Identified  VAR models are sometimes faulted, as are SE models, in 
terms of the rational expectations critique, as follows.  Some of the 
dynamic of  these models arises from the formation of the public's 
expectations. The models have been used to examine the effects of 
making  large, permanent  changes in policy rules. The policy equations 
are  replaced  by possible new rules, and  the remaining  equations,  which 
incorporate  the public's expectations, are left unchanged.  The rational 
expectations  critique  points out that such exercises are potentially  mis- 
leading because they contradict  the probability  structure  of the esti- 
mated model. The model is fit to historical  data under  the assumption 
that variation  in policy can be accounted  for by the model's stochastic 
disturbances-the additive  error  terms  in the policy reaction  functions. 
In the simulation  experiment,  quite a different  form of policy variation 
is examined. If such variation  is not historically  unprecedented,  there 
is a misspecification  in the model: something  that  the model's structure 
implies is impossible has actually  occurred  in the past. This contradic- 
tion invalidates the assumption  that the dynamics of expectations  for- 
mation remain  stable when the policy rule is changed. 
The rational  expectations  critique  reiterates  the general  principle  that 
caution is necessary in extrapolating  models to situations that are far 
from  the history  to which they have been fit. Yet to use a model requires 
applying it to situations that deviate to some extent from past experi- 
ence. It is interesting  and useful to try changing  the policy rules equa- 
tions in a model, holding the other equations fixed, so long as one 
recognizes that this is just a convenient way of generating  a sequence 
of disturbances  to the policy rule originally estimated. Concern  about 
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of policy disturbances  differs substantially  by size or serial correlation 
properties  from what has been observed historically. 
Although the rational  expectations  critique  was initially formulated 
as an attack on traditional  SE modeling and has also been directed 
against identified VAR modeling, it actually applies to all forms of 
macroeconomic  modeling. The critique  emphasizes  that policy should 
always be modeled  as stochastic  and  that  the public's behavior  depends 
on its uncertainty  about  policy. Therefore  one should regard  the exer- 
cise of simulating  a model with a policy rule different from what has 
been fit to history only as one convenient way to generate  a sequence 
of stochastic disturbances  to policy. 
Another branch  of quantitative  macroeconomics, the dynamic sto- 
chastic general equilibrium  (DSGE) approach,  arose largely as a re- 
sponse to the rational  expectations  critique.6  Although  advocates  of this 
approach fault traditional  SE and identified VAR models for being 
insufficiently  attentive  to the rational  expectations  critique,  the methods 
that have been used to examine the effects of policy under  the DSGE 
approach  are equally subject to the critique. The DSGE approach  has 
often embraced  the idea that the only kinds of policy changes that are 
worth studying are those that are historically  unprecedented,  are com- 
pletely unexpected  by the agents populating  the model, and will never 
be reversed. In this situation, DSGE models do give an internally  con- 
sistent answer as to the effects of the policy change. But the need for 
caution remains  as great as in traditional  SE models. Any evidence in 
the data about the effects of such an unprecedented  policy shift has to 
be entirely indirect-an  extrapolation,  based on a priori assumptions, 
to a range  of experience  beyond  that  to which the model has been fitted. 
And the results, despite being internally  consistent, are answers to an 
uninteresting  question:  DSGE  models are  usually  used in policy analysis 
to describe the effects of a type of policy change that never in fact 
occurs. The models that have now evolved from traditional  SE models 
often trace out the effects of nonstochastic shifts in policy reaction 
functions using rational  expectations, as do most DSGE models. Al- 
6.  The DSGE approach  is more commonly known as the real business cycle ap- 
proach. But while it initially used models without nominal rigidities or any role for 
monetary  policy, the methodology  has  now been  extended  to models  that  include  nominal 
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though advocates of the two types of models make very different 
choices about the trade-offs between model abstraction,  internal  con- 
sistency, and fit to the data, the inherent  limitations  of simulating  non- 
stochastic shifts in policy rules are common to both DSGE and the 
newer SE-style models.7 
Note the common thread in the criticisms of the identified VAR 
approach  from  the SE modeling  side and  the DSGE  modeling  side: both 
are uncomfortable  about treating  policy as random. Some would say 
that  one cannot  contemplate  improving  policy as if one could choose it 
rationally  and, at the same time, think of policy as a random  variable. 
This notion is simply incorrect.  Examination  of historical  policy deci- 
sions clearly shows that  policy pursues  multiple  objectives in an uncer- 
tain environment.  Economists  with the Board  of Governors  of the Fed- 
eral Reserve System and  the regional  Federal  Reserve  banks  collect and 
analyze a large body of economic information,  on which the Federal 
Open  Market  Committee  bases its decisions. Committee  members  com- 
pare  staff forecasts  of a wide range  of macroeconomic  variables  against 
their own desired paths for these variables. Each member's policy 
choice minimizes a loss function, subject to a set of ancillary con- 
straints, such as a desire to smooth interest  rates and avoid disrupting 
financial  markets. Federal Reserve policy is an outgrowth  both of the 
members' economic concerns and of  the dynamic interplay among 
members. The result of this process is surely as random  as any other 
aspect of economic behavior. 
When one considers offering advice on current  or future  policy de- 
cisions, one would not ordinarily  propose to flip a coin, but this does 
not mean that it is a mistake  to think  of policy choice as the realization 
of a random variable. Choices that are made systematically by one 
person or group are likely to be unpredictable  by others. If, in a break 
with the past, monetary  policy were to be set by a single, internally 
consistent, rational policymaker, the public would be surprised  and 
would most likely remain  uncertain  for some time that the new pattern 
would persist. Therefore, even if modeling efforts were addressed  to 
7.  Examples  of the newer SE-style models include Bryant  (1991), Bryant,  Hooper, 
and Mann (1993), Taylor (1993), and, in principle, the new Federal Reserve Board 
model described  in Brayton  and Tinsley (1996). An important  design goal of this new 
model is the ability to simulate  both deterministic  rule shifts with rational  expectations 
and policy changes modeled  as shocks to the existing rule. Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  13 
this hypothetical  unified,  rational  policymaker,  one should  model  policy 
choices as the realization  of random  variables  when tracing  their  impact 
on the economy. 
Policy analysts  who work  with models  generally  understand  a DSGE- 
style analysis of nonstochastic  changes in policy rule to characterize 
effects of policy changes in the long run, and analysis of the effects of 
policy shocks with a fixed reaction function equation to characterize 
short-run  effects.8 This is a reasonable  interpretation,  by and large. It 
recognizes that if it is realistic to contemplate changing supposedly 
nonstochastic  coefficients in policy reaction  functions, this is a source 
of  inaccuracy in the model and is  grounds for caution in long-run 
extrapolations.  It also recognizes that a DSGE-style analysis of policy 
rule shifts cannot  be applied  to projecting  the effects of policy changes 
of the type, and over the time horizons, that are the main subject of 
policy discussion, because it models policy as nonstochastic. Ideally, 
one would like a model without either limitation, whose stochastic 
characterization  of policy behavior  encompassed  all the kinds of shifts 
in policy that  one actually  considers. In such a model, every interesting 
and plausible policy change, including those that it seems natural  to 
describe  as changes in policy rule, could be expressed  as a sequence of 
shocks  to the model's driving  random  variables.  There  are  a few models 
in the literature  that go some way toward this goal, for example, by 
modeling policy as switching between linear  rules with additive  errors, 
according to some well-defined Markov process. But the analytical 
difficulties raised by even simple models like this are substantial. 
We should add that this sharp contrast between the approach  of 
DSGE modelers  to the analysis of policy changes and our own reflects 
only a difference of practice. There is nothing in principle that ties 
DSGE models to the approach  that researchers  have commonly taken 
when applying  them to policy analysis. Indeed, Eric Leeper  and  Chris- 
topher  Sims, and  Jinill Kim present  examples  of DSGE  models in which 
8.  Another  way in which policy analysts sometimes characterize  the distinction  is 
to label the effects of policy shocks (with the policy equation  coefficients fixed) as the 
effects of unanticipated  policy changes, and the effects of nonstochastic  changes in 
policy rule as the effects of anticipated,  or credible, policy changes. We regard  this 
distinction  as much  less helpful than  the long- and short-run  distinction.  It may encour- 
age the idea that there is some choice as to whether  policy changes will be credible 
when first announced.  In fact, credibility  can only arise from a consistent pattern  of 
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careful attention  is paid to modeling the stochastic structure  of policy, 
therefore  allowing examination  of the effects of both stochastic  disturb- 
ances to policy and deterministic  changes in policy rule.9 
Nor is there any fundamental  conflict between the mathematics  of 
our modeling approach  in this paper and that of DSGE models. Our 
model is linear, whereas most DSGE models are nonlinear;  but their 
nonlinearities  are not usually strong. Indeed, one common  approach  to 
solving and fitting DSGE models to the data is to take a linear approx- 
imation to them around  a steady state. A linearized DSGE model be- 
comes a VAR model, with a particular  pattern  of identifying  restrictions 
on its coefficients. Since linearized  DSGE models are generally much 
more strongly restricted  than identified VAR models, there are many 
fewer free parameters  to estimate. However, the kinds of restrictions 
that are used to identify VAR models are often imposed as a subset of 
the restrictions  used in DSGE models, so that identified  VAR models 
can be thought  of as weakly restricted  linearized  DSGE models. 
This is what, in fact, distinguishes the DSGE from the identified 
VAR modeling approach.  The former  begins with a complete interpre- 
tation of each source of stochastic disturbance  in the model, invoking 
many conventional but arbitrary  restrictions on functional forms of 
utility and  production  functions  and  on stochastic  properties  of disturb- 
ances. The fitted model can tell the full story about  how, and by what 
means, each source of disturbance  affects the economy. The identified 
VAR modeling  approach,  by contrast,  begins with an unidentified  time- 
series model of the economy and introduces  identifying information 
cautiously. The fitted  model then fits the data  well, usually much  better 
than DSGE models of the same data, but tells only an incomplete  story 
about  each source of disturbance.  In an identified  VAR, many sources 
of disturbance  typically are not completely interpreted,  but are merely 
identified  as part  of a vector of private  sector shocks, for example, that 
may mix technology shocks and taste shocks. The effects of monetary 
policy disturbances  on the economy may be traced  out, but how those 
effects work  their  way through  the behavior  of investors  and  consumers 
may not be completely apparent. 
Each approach  has its advantages  and its disadvantages.  The identi- 
fied VAR approach  may give a more accurate  impression  of the degree 
9.  Leeper  and Sims (1994); Jinill Kim (1996). Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  15 
of uncertainty  about  the model's results. It also reduces the chance of 
attributing  to the data a result that actually flows almost entirely from 
initial ad hoc modeling assumptions.  At the same time, the identified 
VAR approach  does not provide  as convenient  a framework  for applying 
a priori  knowledge or hypotheses about  the structure  of the economy. 
After  considering  alternatives  to and  criticisms  of the identified  VAR 
approach, we conclude that such strictly linear, weakly identified 
models do have limitations.  We would  not be comfortable  extrapolating 
our estimates of policy effects to regimes of hyperinflation  or to very 
different  fiscal policy environments,  for example.  '0 But we regard  it as 
an advantage,  not a defect, that our approach  recognizes the stochastic 
nature  of variation  in policy. 
Inference 
We take the perspective of the likelihood principle in measuring 
model fit and assessing how well various hypotheses accord with the 
data. That is, we understand  the task of reporting  efforts at statistical 
model-fitting as characterizing  the shape of the likelihood function. 
Most econometric  procedures  can be interpreted  as reasonable  from  this 
perspective. However, it is different  from that which is usually taught 
in econometrics  courses, and  it does have implications  that  should  affect 
practice in some areas, particularly when, as in this paper, near- 
nonstationary  models, or models with large  numbers  of parameters,  are 
being considered.  " 
In discussing our  results  below, we do not present  measures  of model 
fit and test the restrictions  in the models. Such tests can be useful as 
part  of describing  the likelihood function, but the models that we are 
dealing with are, for the most part, only weakly overidentified.  That 
is,  they are almost as unrestricted  as an unidentified  reduced form 
model. Accordingly, they tend to fit very well relative to such uniden- 
tified reduced form models, and this is neither surprising nor very 
powerful  evidence in favor of the interpretations  of the data that they 
10. Actually, we would be equally uncomfortable  extrapolating  policy effects im- 
plied by DSGE models that are fitted  or calibrated  to U.S. data to such situations, but 
for somewhat  different  reasons. 
1.  See Berger  and Wolpert  (1988) for a general  discussion of the likelihood prin- 
ciple, and Gelman and others (1995) for an approach  to applied statistical work that 
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embody. We do present  error  bands around  the impulse responses  that 
we trace out for our models.  12 These are important  because, in many 
cases, differences in the forms of their implied responses to monetary 
policy shocks influence  our conclusions about  how reliable  models are. 
We would not want to be choosing between models on the basis of 
differences in their implied impulse responses if estimates of those 
responses were not, in fact, sharply  determined. 
In models as large as some of  those that we consider here, the 
likelihood function itself can be ill behaved. This property  is related  to 
the well-known tendency of estimates to become unreasonable  when 
degrees of freedom are low. We therefore  multiply all the likelihood 
functions that we discuss by a probability  density function that down- 
weights models with large coefficients on distant  lags or with explosive 
dynamics.'3  This probability  density function plays the formal role of 
a Bayesian prior distribution,  but it is not meant as a summary  of all 
the prior information  that we might have about model parameters.  It 
only reflects a simple summary  of beliefs that are likely to be uncon- 
troversial  across  a wide range  of users  of the analysis. Our  methodology 
allows discussion of larger  models than  has been feasible with previous 
approaches. 
Identifying Monetary Policy 
The history  of empirical  work  in identifying  monetary  policy consists 
largely of expanding  model scale; progress  in understanding  models at 
one scale has provided  the basis for expansion  to more  complex models. 
Most of this history is described in the identified VAR framework, 
although much of it predates the codification of this framework.  To 
some extent, though, we are describing  not an evolution over time, but 
12. These error  bands have an intuitive interpretation:  they correspond  to regions 
within which the impulse responses lie with some stated probability,  given what we 
have discovered  about  the model from the data. Thus they are not classical confidence 
bands or regions, which are very difficult to construct  and of dubious usefulness for 
models like these. See Sims and Zha (1995) for further  discussion. 
13. Such a probability  density function is sometimes  called a reference  prior. Our 
reference  prior  is described  in appendix  B, and  our methodology  is given a more  general 
context in Sims and Zha (1996). Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  17 
a layering of evidence produced  by models of different  levels of com- 
plexity, all of which are influencing  economists even now. 
The simplest  level of evidence involves bivariate  modeling, in which 
a single variable  is taken  as a measure  of the stance  of monetary  policy. 
In this context, the monetary  policy measure is usually taken to be 
predetermined. 
Timing Patterns 
Part of the strength of the view that monetary  policy has been an 
important  generator  of business cycle fluctuations  comes from certain 
patterns  in the data, apparent  to the eye. For  example, as figure 1 shows, 
most postwar recessions in the United States have been preceded by 
rising interest  rates. If one therefore  concludes  that  most postwar  reces- 
sions in the United States have been preceded  by periods of monetary 
tightening, the evidence for an important  role of monetary  policy in 
generating recessions seems strong. While it can be shown that one 
variable  leading another  in timing is neither  a necessary  nor a sufficient 
condition for its being predetermined  in a bivariate  system of the form 
of equation 1, it is often assumed, probably correctly, that the two 
conditions are at least likely to occur together; so a graph like this 
influences  beliefs about  the effects of monetary  policy. 
But a little reflection turns  up problems  of interpretation-identifi- 
cation problems-that  are pervasive in this area. In general, interest 
rates were rising from the 1950s through  the 1970s, but interest rates 
fall sharply after business cycle peaks. How much of the pattern  that 
strikes the eye comes simply from the rising trend  interacting  with the 
post-peak  rate drops?  The only cyclical peak that  is not preceded  by an 
increase in interest  rates is also the only peak since the early 1980s- 
that is,  the only one to occur during a period of generally declining 
interest  rates. Interest  rates are cyclical variables. A number  of other 
variables  show patterns  like that  in figure 1. For example, the producer 
price index for crude materials  (PCM), shown in figure 2, presents a 
pattern  very similar to that in figure 1 for the period since 1960, if 
anything,  with more clearly defined  cyclical timing. In order  to control 
inflation,  monetary  policy must set interest  rates systematically, react- 
ing to the state of the economy. If it does so, then whether or not it 
influences  real activity, a pattern  like figure 1 could easily emerge. >  0 
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In what might  be regarded as an early  real business  cycle  model, 
James Tobin showed that the timing patterns that monetarists had been 
documenting  in order to support models in which monetary policy  con- 
tributes to  generating  cycles  could  also  emerge  in a model  in which 
monetary policy  plays  no  such  role."'  He  answered  the rich array of 
informally interpreted time-series  evidence  presented by Milton Fried- 
man and other monetarists with a simple dynamic general-equilibrium 
model that provides an alternative interpretation of essentially  the same 
facts.  Although  both  the  analysis  of  the  empirical  evidence  and the 
theoretical  models  have since  grown more complex,  in many respects 
the interplay between data and models today echoes the Friedman-Tobin 
debate. 
The recent literature has studied the joint behavior of larger sets of 
relevant time series.  It has begun to explore  the gap between  textbook 
macroeconomic  models-with  a single  money stock and a single inter- 
est rate-and  the real world of monetary policy,  with multiple defini- 
tions  of  the  money  stock,  reserves  borrowed  and unborrowed,  and 
multiple interest rates. The new counterarguments against the monetar- 
ists are based on stochastic,  rather than deterministic,  dynamic general- 
equilibrium models and aim to account for more than the simple timing 
relationships  that Tobin has addressed. 
Money and Income: Post Hoc,  Ergo Propter Hoc,  Redux 
Although  monetarist  policy  is  out of  fashion,  the  statistical  time- 
series regularities that made it plausible remain. Their monetarist inter- 
pretation retains its surface appeal,  and it remains an important test of 
other policy  approaches that they be able to explain these regularities. 15 
Surprise changes  in the stock of money  ("innovations"  in the money 
stock) are persistent and predict subsequent movements  in both prices 
and output in the same direction.  As Milton Friedman has argued, this 
14.  Tobin (1970). 
15.  Benjamin  Friedman  and Kuttner (1992)  present  evidence  that the  monetarist 
statistical  regularities  have  weakened  for the period  1970-90,  in comparison  with  the 
period  1960-79.  But while  the relationships are statistically  weaker in the latter period, 
the smaller effects  do not seem to be estimated so precisely  as to strongly contradict the 
results from the earlier period. Moreover,  there is some indication that the relationships 
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relationship is more than a correlation and a timing pattern. 16 The timing 
of cyclical  peaks is notoriously  sensitive  to differencing  or other filter- 
ing of the data. However,  no method of data filtering changes  the fact 
that monetary aggregates contain substantial variation that past output 
data do not help to predict, or that this variation in money does help to 
predict future output. The response of the price level  to a money stock 
innovation  is smooth  and slow;  the response  of  output is quicker and 
less  sustained;  innovations  in prices  and output have  little  predictive 
power  for  money.  Figure  3  shows  how  the  impulse  responses  of  a 
monthly  VAR  in MI,  a measure of  the consumer  price  index  (CPI), 
and real GDP (Y), fit over the period from January 1960 through March 
1996,  summarize these  regularities. II A model with a measure of M2 
in place of MI presents a similar picture, although it implies that output 
has a more persistent response to an M2 surprise. 
The  smooth,  slow  response  of  prices  does  not easily  fit a rational 
expectations  monetarist view that treats money stock surprises as equiv- 
alent to price  surprises: the money  surprise leads  to very predictable 
inflation  only  after  a delay.  But  a more  eclectic  monetarist  view- 
holding that money's  effects  arise from a variety of temporary frictions 
and money illusion  but dissipate over time-is  quite consistent with the 
qualitative  results in the right-hand column of figure 3.  Note,  though, 
that the graphs on each row  share a common  scale,  so that the three 
16.  Friedman does  not formulate  the point  in quite  this  way.  But in his  writings, 
often  in the context  of qualitative  discussion  of  historical  episodes,  he repeatedly  em- 
phasizes  that influences  of  current and past business  activity  on the money  supply  are 
weak,  while  the  predictive  value  of  changes  in  the  money  stock  for  future output  is 
large. This amounts to claiming  that monetary aggregates  are close  to predetermined in 
a bivariate system  that relates  a monetary aggregate  to a measure of  real activity.  The 
rational expectations  version of monetarism formalized  this claim in language now used 
in the identified  VAR  literature. It has interpreted innovations  in monetary aggregates 
as policy  disturbances,  which  is equivalent  to taking the money  stock  to be  predeter- 
mined; see,  for example,  Barro (1977). 
17.  In this paper we use a number of series  that, like GDP here, do not exist  at the 
monthly level  of time aggregation.  In each case,  we use related series to interpolate the 
quarterly data, according  to the methods  described  in appendix A.  Henceforth,  we  do 
not point out such interpolated series  in the text.  All  variables are defined in appendix 
A,  and, unless  otherwise  stated,  our estimation  period is January 1960 through March 
1996 with six lags (so that the first data used are for July 1959).  We measure all variables 
in log units, except for interest rates and the unemployment rate. In the figures, however, 
scales present the percent (or, in the case of rate variables,  percentage point) deviations 
of underlying variables,  not log variables. 22  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
Figure  3. Impulse  Response  Functions  for a Three-Variable  Model Including  Ml, 
Recursive  Identificationa 
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Source: Authors' vector autoregressions (VARs),  as described in text, using data described in appendix A. 
a. Each cett depicts the forty-eight-month  response of the given row variabte  to a shock to the given cotumn variabte. Dashed 
tines are 68 percent  probabitity  bands,  estimated  point by point;  they would correspond  approximately  to one standard  error  bands 
if the posterior probability density function had a jointly normal shape.  The system is estimated by using the reference prior 
described in appendix B.  Impulse responses are orthogonalized recursively in the order  shown, with the innovation in the last 
listed variable  untransformed,  the innovation  in the second to last taken  as orthogonal  to that  in the last, and so on.  The estimation 
includes six lags and a constant. 
b. Percent  deviation  from initial level. 
responses  displayed  in the  middle  row  "add  up"  (in  a mean-square 
sense)  to an explanation  for all the variation in output. The proportion 
accounted for by money surprises is small. Furthermore, the error bands 
show  that versions  of the model  with no response  from real output to 
money  surprises are not strongly inconsistent  with the data (they seem 
to be  within  a two  standard error band).  This  model  is therefore not 
consistent with the view that most business cycle fluctuations arise from 
random fluctuations  in monetary policy.  Although  it is rarely empha- 
sized,  the weakness  of the statistical relation between monetary aggre- 
gates and real activity was noted even in early studies that used careful Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  23 
time-series  methods  and has recently  been  reconfirmed by  Benjamin 
Friedman and Kenneth Kuttner.18 
Interest Rates 
Sims  points  out  elsewhere  that although  little  of  the  variation  in 
monetary aggregates is predictable from data on past prices and output, 
a considerable  amount can be predicted once information on past inter- 
est rates is taken into account. 19  The component of money variation that 
is  predictable  from  interest  rates  is  more  strongly  related  to  output 
changes than are other components.  The proportion of output variation 
attributable to  money  stock  surprises drops substantially  in a system 
that includes a short interest rate. This pattern is confirmed by figure 4, 
which shows that in a system including an interest rate on federal funds 
(RF),  money  innovations  lose  much  of  their  predictive  power  for 
output. 20 
The liquidity  effect-a  decrease  in nominal interest rates accompa- 
nying monetary expansion-is  an important feature in many theories of 
the monetary transmission  mechanism.  The responses  to money  inno- 
vations in this system,  displayed in the fourth column of figure 4,  show 
what is sometimes  called the liquidity puzzle: the interest rate declines 
only very slightly and temporarily as MI jumps upward.2' Central bank- 
ers usually  think of themselves  as controlling  monetary aggregates by 
means of  interest rates,  with lower  interest rates inevitably  accompa- 
nying  a policy-generated  expansion  of MI.  The estimated  pattern of 
18.  See  Sims  (1972),  for an example  of  an early study,  and Friedman and Kuttner 
(1992). 
19.  Sims (1980a). 
20.  Todd  (1990)  shows  that the  finding  implied  by  the  point  estimates  in  Sims 
(1980a)  and reproduced in figure 4-that  money innovations  have essentially  no predic- 
tive  power  for output once  interest rates are introduced-is  not robust.  However,  the 
finding  that interest  rate innovations  have  more  predictive  power  for  output  than do 
money innovations  is robust across sample periods,  time units,  and variable definitions 
in Todd's  study.  A version  of  figure 4  formed  with M2  would  show  that in the move 
from  a  three-variable  model  to  a  four-variable  model,  the  predictive  power  of  M2 
variations is less diminished than that of M I innovations; but, in line with Todd's results, 
replacing MI  with M2 leaves  unchanged the phenomenon  that interest rate innovations 
have more predictive power for output than do money  innovations. 
21.  For a discussion  of the difficulties  that empirical researchers have had in finding 
a decline  in  interest  rates  following  a  monetary  expansion,  see  Leeper  and Gordon 
(1992). 24  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1  996 
Figure  4. Impulse  Response  Functions  for a Four-Variable  Model, 
Recursive  Identificationa 
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Source:  Authors'  VARs, as described  in text, using data  described  in appendix  A. 
a. For  explanation  of the figure,  see figure  3, note a. 
b. Percent  deviation  from initial level; for RF, percentage  point deviation. 
response  to a money  innovation,  with little or no reduction of interest 
rates as Ml  rises,  therefore  seems  to  contradict common  sense.  The 
liquidity  effect,  which  hypothesizes  that the policy-induced  increased 
liquidity of a monetary expansion  should lower interest rates, does not 
seem to be present. 
This  is not a problem for the interest rate innovation  shown  in the 
third column of figure 4.  If this column is interpreted as representing a 
monetary contraction,  it shows  a strong liquidity  effect:  money  con- 
tracts quickly and stays persistently below average following  an interest 
rate jump  that is  itself  persistent.  After  an initial  delay  of  about six 
months, output begins to decline persistently.  But here one encounters 
what has been called the price puzzle.  The top panel of the third column 
shows  that prices  rise  steadily  following  an interest rate innovation. Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  25 
Interpreting the third column  as a monetary contraction  therefore re- 
quires  accepting  that monetary contraction  produces  inflation,  which 
seems as unlikely as the notion that monetary expansion does not lower 
interest rates. 
The  fourth column,  if  it is  the monetary policy  shock,  displays  a 
liquidity puzzle.  However,  this and the price puzzle of the third column 
might be eliminated  by taking something  close  to a difference  of  the 
two columns.  The third column less  the fourth would  show a positive 
movement  in the funds rate that is less  persistent than that in the third 
column,  a negative  movement  in MI  that is more pronounced than in 
either column  individually,  a negative  movement  in Y with less  of  an 
initial positive  blip as in the third column but with less persistence,  and 
little movement  in CPI.  In fact,  a set of restrictions on A, that in itself 
has  some  appeal  delivers  approximately  this  result.  We  present this 
very small model not as a preferred interpretation of the data, but as an 
illustration  of  types  of  reasoning  and interpretation that we  apply  in 
more complicated  settings,  below. 
Suppose that, because data on the price level and output emerge only 
after complex  and time-consuming  collection  and processing,  monetary 
policymakers  do not respond within the month to changes  in CPI and 
Y. Suppose,  further, that CPI and Y are not responsive  within the month 
to changes  in RF and MI.  The justification  for this assumption is that 
there are planning processes  involved  in changing output and in chang- 
ing the prices of final goods.  This is not to say that CPI and Y show no 
short-run changes.  Crop failures,  new  inventions,  consumer  dissatis- 
faction  with the new  fall  line of  coats  can all result in such short-run 
variation. But the financial signals embodied in monetary variables are 
postulated to influence  CPI and Y smoothly  over time,  and very little 
within a month. This set of restrictions can be displayed  in a matrix of 
Xs and blanks as follows: 
Sector  Variable  CPI  Y  RF  Ml 
P  CPI  X  X 
P  Y  X  X 
I  RF  X  X  X  X 
F  Ml  X  X 
The Xs indicate coefficients  in A, that are unrestricted, and the blanks 
indicate coefficients  that are postulated to be zero.  The first row gives 
the names of the variables,  and the first column gives  the names of the 26  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
sectors in which disturbances or shocks originate.  The F shock repre- 
sents random variation in Federal Reserve behavior,  the two P shocks 
represent the behavior  of  private sector variables  that do not respond 
quickly  to financial  signals,  and the I shock represents other disturb- 
ances to private sector behavior ("I"  stands for information,  meaning 
that this  component  of  nonpolicy  behavior  responds  quickly  to  new 
information).22 The two P equations have the same restrictions and are 
therefore  indistinguishable.  They  can be premultiplied  by  any ortho- 
normal (2  x  2) matrix and yet satisfy the same restrictions.  Since these 
two equations do not have separate interpretations, we normalize them 
arbitrarily by changing the Y coefficient  in the first row from an X to a 
blank. This results in a system that is overidentified by one restriction. 
The results of estimating  this system are displayed  in figure 5. 
The fourth column of figure 5 is a plausible candidate for a measure 
of the effect  of  tightening  monetary policy.  RF rises  initially,  but re- 
turns to its original level  over the course of about a year. MI declines, 
and most of the variation in MI  is accounted  for by these policy  dis- 
turbances. Y declines  persistently,  but not much of the overall variance 
in output is attributed to the policy disturbance. CPI moves negligibly- 
very slightly  downward.  There are some problems with the interpreta- 
tion.  Since  the  output  decline  is  so  small  (only  about  a tenth  of  a 
percent),  the price decline  is negligible,  and the interest rate increase 
is so temporary, it is hard to understand why MI  responds so strongly 
and persistently  (almost a full percentage point). 
The  first three columns  show  that every  private  sector  shock  that 
implies inflation elicits  a contractionary response from the interest rate. 
As we observe above,  in discussing  the robustness of conclusions  from 
identified  VARs,  this means that certain aspects  of the results are not 
sensitive  to the identifying  assumptions.  Most of observed variation in 
the interest rate is accounted  for by these  endogenous  responses,  not 
by what have been identified as policy  shocks.  Most of the variation in 
output and prices is accounted for by the first and third columns,  which 
22.  We could have labeled this equation  MD-for  money demand-as  it contains 
contemporaneously  all four of the traditional  arguments  of liquidity preference  in an 
ISLM  model. However,  over much  of our sample  period,  most of the deposits  that  make 
up MI paid interest,  so a short  interest  rate  such as RF did not represent  the opportunity 
cost of holding  MI. Probably  more important,  in this small model this sector has to be 
the locus of all nonpolicy effects on the interest  rate and MI. Therefore  we would not 
insist that this equation  be interpreted  as money demand. Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  27 
Figure  5. Impulse  Response  Functions  for a Four-Variable  Model, 
Nonrecursive  Identificationa 
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Source:  Authors'  VARs, as described  in text, using data  described  in appendix  A. 
a. For  explanation  of the figure,  see figure  3, note a. 
b. Percent  deviation  from initial level; for RF, percentage  point deviation. 
look like supply shocks,  in that they move prices and output in opposite 
directions.  The response of interest rates to the inflationary shock is at 
least as strong in these cases as when output moves in the same direction 
as prices,  as in the second  column.  From figures 4  and 5,  it appears 
that there is  no  possibility  of  transforming  the  system  to  produce  a 
column in which interest rate increases are followed  by substantial price 
declines.  It might be possible,  by approximately differencing the second 
and third columns of figure 5, to produce another pattern similar to that 
in the fourth but with stronger output effects  and weaker effects  on M1. 
Although this model is simple,  the basic  approach-excluding  cer- 
tain variables from a contemporaneous impact on policy behavior, while 
asserting that certain private sector variables respond only with a delay 
to financial variables-has  been followed  in one form or another in the 28  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
identified VAR literature since Sims's  work in the mid- 1980s, at least.23 
Nonetheless,  this  model  cannot  be  a stopping  place  in our analysis. 
Analysts  use  an  array of  additional  variables-for  example,  stock 
prices,  long interest rates, exchange rates, commodity  price indexes- 
to forecast prices and output, and Federal Reserve  behavior could cer- 
tainly depend on such indicators of the state of the economy.  By omit- 
ting such variables,  we relegate their effects  to the disturbance term. 
Reserves 
Ml  responds  quickly  to private sector behavior  and is not directly 
controlled  in the short run by the Federal Reserve.  This  suggests  that 
one should expect problems in interpreting MI suprises as disturbances 
to monetary policy.  One way to circumvent the fact that much of the 
variation in MI  is demand determined is simply to replace Ml  with a 
reserve aggregate that the Federal Reserve arguably might control more 
directly.  Textbook  discussions  of the money multiplier might lead one 
to think that this would not qualitatively  change the results.  But this is 
not the case.  Consider figure 6,  which  shows  what happens when one 
replaces MI  by total reserves  adjusted for changes  in reserve require- 
ments (TR) in the model of figure 3.24  The output response to a money 
shock,  already modest in figure 3, has almost completely  disappeared, 
and the price response is also much weaker. It is possible that this result 
is moving closer to the truth: by using Ml  or a measure of M2, one can 
confuse endogenous  components of the monetary aggregate with policy 
disturbances,  thus  exaggerating  the  effects  of  policy.  However,  we 
23.  Sims (1986). 
24.  We have discovered  in the course of our work that "adjustment  for changes in 
reserve  requirements"  has dubious  effects on the reserve  series. Because of the way in 
which the series is constructed, the ratio of  adjusted  to unadjusted  reserves varies 
substantially  from month  to month, even in periods  when there is no change in reserve 
requirements,  because of fluctuations  in the distribution  of deposits across categories 
with different  reserve requirements.  This creates a component  of demand-determined 
fluctuations  in "reserves" that has nothing  to do with the Federal  Reserve's actions to 
change the volume of reserves. In our modeling, we have sometimes found that even 
the signs of responses  of adjusted  and unadjusted  reserves  differed  and that unadjusted 
reserves seemed to have a stronger  relation to other nominal variables  than adjusted 
reserves. Unadjusted  reserves does show occasional large  jumps-when  requirements 
change and the change is accommodated  by the Federal  Reserve-that  do not have the 
same effects as reserve  changes  unaccompanied  by changes in requirements.  This topic 
deserves further  exploration. Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  29 
Figure 6. Impulse Response  Functions  for a Three-Variable  Model Including 
Total Reserves,  Recursive  Identificationa 
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Source:  Authors'  VARs, as described  in text, using data described  in appendix  A. 
a. For  explanation  of the figure,  see figure  3, note a. 
b. Percent  deviation  from initial level. 
show below  that it is equally possible  to maintain that reserves contain 
a substantial demand-determined  component,  so that neither surprise 
changes  in reserves  nor surprise changes  in the money  stock are good 
measures of monetary policy.25 
Three  studies-by  Steven  Strongin;  Lawrence  Christiano,  Martin 
Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans; and Ben Bernanke and Ilian Mihov- 
introduce  some  details  of  the  banking  system  to  analyze  the  conse- 
quences  of the Federal Reserve's  allocation  of total reserves  between 
borrowed and nonborrowed reserves.26 By concentrating exclusively  on 
25.  Gordon  and Leeper  (1994) estimate  separate  models with reserves  and with M2 
as the monetary  aggregate.  Their models are larger  and use quite different  identifying 
assumptions  than  ours here, and they obtain  quite different  results. 
26.  Strongin (1995); Christiano, Eichenbaum,  and Evans (1996); Bernanke  and 
Mihov (1995). 30  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
the reserves  market,  thus entirely  omitting  consumer-level  monetary 
aggregates from the model,  this line of work downplays the importance 
of private sector money  demand behavior.  These  models  also tend to 
assume  a recursive  economic  structure,  with  sluggish  private  sector 
variables appearing first in the recursive ordering. In addition,  the au- 
thors typically  do not discuss  thoroughly the restrictions on nonpolicy 
equations  that are necessary  to justify  their interpretations.  Bernanke 
and Mihov  address this shortcoming  by providing  economic  interpre- 
tations for the banking sector equations in Strongin's and in Christiano, 
Eichenbaum,  and Evans's  models.27 These  interpretations involve  re- 
strictions not imposed  by the original authors. 
These  reserves  models  can be  understood  in the  context  of  a six- 
variable  system,  including  output,  the price  level,  commodity  prices 
(PC),  the  federal  funds rate,  nonborrowed  reserves  (NBR),  and total 
reserves.  The work summarized here excludes  the discount rate on the 
grounds that it is an administered rate that does  not play an important 
role in month-to-month policy  decisions.  The infrequent changes in the 
discount  rate are taken to be mainly  delayed  responses  to already ex- 
isting  information.  The following  informal table describes the models 
in terms of their A, matrices: 
Sector  Variable  Y  CPI  PC  RF  NBR  TR 
P  Y  C 
P  CPI  C  C 
I  PC  c  c  c 
F  RF  c  c  c  x  x  x 
B  NBR  c  c  c  x  x  x 
B  TR  c  c  c  x  x  x 
Equations are grouped into sectors.  If a cell  is filled, the variable spec- 
ified on the top row enters that equation; C denotes a coefficient  that is 
nonzero across models,  and X denotes a coefficient  that may be nonzero 
in different specifications.  Empty cells  correspond to zero restrictions. 
There are four behaviorally  distinct sectors in the model: private slug- 
gish (P),  information (I),  Federal Reserve  policy  (F),  and the banking 
system  (B).  As before,  the private sluggish  sector describes  aspects of 
private sector behavior that respond slowly to financial variables,  while 
the I sector describes those aspects that respond without delay. Behavior 
27.  Bernanke  and Mihov (1995) also present  a simultaneous  model in which policy 
and  banking  behavior  interact  to determine  equilibrium  prices and quantities. Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  31 
within  the private and information sectors  is not specified,  so  shocks 
associated  with those equations have no clear economic  meaning other 
than being disturbances that are not associated  with monetary policy  or 
banking behavior. 
The  six-variable  system  allows  up to twenty-one  coefficients  to be 
freely  estimated.  Since  the first three columns  take up fifteen  coeffi- 
cients,  no  more  than six  unrestricted  coefficients  in  the  lower  right 
(3  x  3)  matrix may be estimated.  Production and information  sector 
variables enter policy and banking sector equations,  implying that those 
sectors observe  and respond to output, overall prices,  and commodity 
prices contemporaneously.  Variables like commodity prices,  which are 
determined in auction markets, can be continuously observed,  so it may 
be reasonable  to assume  the Federal Reserve  responds to information 
gleaned  from  such  series.  The  assumption  that the  Federal  Reserve 
knows current values of real GDP and consumer prices,  however,  is at 
best an approximation to its actual information set. 
Bernanke and Mihov  reinterpret the work of Strongin and of Chris- 
tiano, Eichenbaum,  and Evans by attaching behavioral meaning to each 
equation  in the F and B  sectors.  They  impose  the restriction that the 
coefficients  on TR and NBR in the fifth equation have equal magnitudes 
but  opposite  signs,  reflecting  a view  that the  demand  for  borrowed 
reserves (BWR) should be homogeneous  in the overall level of reserves. 
(There is certainly no reason why this has to be true, especially  in the 
short run, as here, although it may be a reasonable working hypothesis.) 
The inclusion  of  Y and CPI in the relation follows  from the fact that 
the  demand  for  reserves  is  derived  from the  need  to  satisfy  reserve 
requirements and the desire to manage reserve positions  closely.  The 
presence of PC is more difficult to justify;  there are many other varia- 
bles that could  more appropriately be included  in the derived demand 
function. 
Strongin does  not provide  such  a complete  interpretation of  the F 
and B sectors.  He does not impose  Bernanke and Mihov's  assumption 
of  homogeneity,  but he  adds the  restrictions  that demand  for  TR is 
interest inelastic  in the short run and is unrelated to NBR, and that the 
Federal Reserve  sets the supply of NBR without regard to the current 
funds rate. Thus the monetary policy  shock  is a change  in the distri- 
bution  of  a  given  quantity  of  total  reserves  between  borrowed  and 
nonborrowed reserves.  This leaves  Strongin with an exactly  identified 32  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
model  that can  be  put into  recursive  form  for  easy  estimation.  The 
following  informal table presents his model of reserves market behav- 
ior,  showing  his  version  of  the lower  right corner of  the six-variable 
model that we have shown above.  We should also note that Strongin's 
original identification  does not include PC. 
Sector  Variable  RF  NBR  TR 
F  RF  X  X 
B  NBR  X  X  X 
B  TR  X 
Strongin justifies the assumption that demand for reserves is interest 
inelastic  by appealing to institutional rigidities.  He argues that within 
a reserve  maintenance  period,  the  banking  system  as  a whole  must 
borrow at the discount  window  to meet a reserve shortfall.  Given that 
the demand for required reserves  is largely determined by current and 
past  deposits,  if  the  demand  for  excess  reserves  is  unresponsive  to 
policy,  in the short run the quantity of total reserves will be determined 
entirely by demand.28 Although  persuasive  at the high frequencies  as- 
sociated with reserve settlement periods, the argument carries less force 
at the monthly frequency of Strongin's data. Figure 7 shows the relation 
of  excess  reserves  to  monthly  changes  in required reserves  over  our 
sample period.  While  there are more reserves  relative  to the monthly 
changes early and late in the sample, over the whole period the changes 
and the  excess  reserves  are of  the  same  order of  magnitude.  Banks 
therefore  have  substantial  room  to  trade the  tighter  management  of 
reserves  against the interest costs  of carrying excess  reserves.  In fact, 
simple  regressions  of  excess  reserves  on interest rates suggest  a sub- 
stantial interest elasticity  in excess  reserves. 
The  restriction  that is  most  important in distinguishing  Strongin's 
conclusions  from those of other researchers is the claim that the Federal 
Reserve pays no attention within the month to the current federal funds 
rate. Most observers think, instead, that the Federal Reserve sets target 
values for the funds rate and undertakes open market operations to stay 
close  to  those  targets  on  a time  scale  considerably  shorter than one 
28.  In terms of the estimated  VAR, the entire monthly  innovation  in total reserves 
is attributed  to shifts in the demand  function. A necessary  condition for the elasticity 
restriction  is that the demand  for excess reserves be completely unresponsive  to any 
variables  that policy may affect immediately.  For further  details, see Strongin  (1995, 
pp. 467-72). 00 
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month. Furthermore, Strongin assumes that the Federal Reserve manip- 
ulates the federal funds rate by manipulating borrowings.  In fact,  most 
banks do not borrow at the discount window in most reserve accounting 
periods.  This is not just because  the Federal Reserve frowns on exces- 
sive borrowing.  The federal funds market is a private market in which 
the creditworthiness  of borrowers is an important concern.  An individ- 
ual bank that needs to borrow an unusually large amount relative to its 
assets  or its history of borrowing is likely  to raise questions  and thus, 
in effect,  to  face  its  own  upward-sloping  supply  of  funds,  just  as is 
usually posited for individual business borrowers from banks. The Fed- 
eral Reserve  discount  window,  on the other hand, is meant to provide 
a safety valve for banks that are temporarily in difficulty.  But precisely 
because  it has this  function,  the fact  that a bank is borrowing  at the 
discount  window  may  convey  information.  Banks  may  therefore  be 
reluctant to use the discount window,  despite the apparent profitability 
of doing so.29 Borrowing may indeed vary systematically  with the struc- 
ture of  rates,  but we  do  not  find it plausible  to  think of  the Federal 
Reserve  as setting the funds rate by manipulating the level  of borrow- 
ing.  More  likely,  the  Federal  Reserve  sets  the  funds  rate at a level 
determined by assessing  the overall state of the economy and undertakes 
open market operations to achieve  its funds rate targets.  It is unlikely 
that an unusually  high need for discount  window  borrowing would be 
choked  off  by a rise in the funds rate, as Strongin's  specification  im- 
plies.  Instead,  the Federal Reserve  would probably maintain its funds 
rate target  while  accommodating  the  temporary  rise  in  demand  for 
borrowing. 
Christiano, Eichenbaum,  and Evans assume that the Federal Reserve 
sets  the  supply  of NBR without  regard to either  TR or RF,  but relax 
Strongin's  assumption  that borrowed  and  nonborrowed  reserves  are 
unresponsive  to the funds rate. Their model  of the reserves  market is 
as follows: 
29.  Meulendyke  (1992) and  Clouse (1994) discuss the development  of reluctance  by 
banks  to borrow  at the discount  window. Clouse emphasizes  that  the greater  reluctance 
has weakened  the relationship  between  borrowing  and  the spread  between  the funds  rate 
and the discount rate and has impaired  the effectiveness of the discount window at 
tempering  unexpected  pressure  in the reserves market.  This, in turn, has reduced  the 
Federal  Reserve's emphasis  on borrowed  reserves  in the day-to-day  management  of the 
reserve  market. Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  35 
Sector  Variable  RF  NBR  TR 
F  RF  X 
B  NBR  X  X  X 
B  TR  X  X 
Their rationale for this identification  of  policy  is that open market 
operations directly affect nonborrowed reserves,  making NBR a control 
variable for the monetary authority.  As  discussed  above,  though,  the 
fact that policy  authorities choose  a variable does  not imply that they 
choose  not  to  make  it respond  to  other variables.  In regard to  their 
assumption that the Federal Reserve pays no attention within the month 
to the funds rate, our arguments against Strongin's  specification  apply. 
In previous  work,  Sims  notes  that a price  puzzle-rising  interest 
rates accompanied by inflation-might  emerge in a model that does not 
include a rich enough  specification  of the information available to pol- 
icymakers.30 If policymakers  can observe  variables that forecast infla- 
tion,  but those  variables  are not included  in the model,  there will  be 
apparently unpredictable changes in interest rates that are actually sys- 
tematic responses  to information implying  that inflation is on the way. 
This could give  the impression  that tightening monetary policy  gener- 
ates inflation.  Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and Evans introduce commod- 
ity prices to reduce this source of bias: policy  authorities are assumed 
to observe  and react to current values of commodity  prices.  However, 
these  authors merge  commodity  prices  with  other variables  in the  P 
sector and make them share the sectoral property of  no within-month 
response  to  monetary  policy  variables.  Since  commodity  prices  are 
determined in thick auction markets and change  daily,  this restriction 
on PC seems  strained.3  1 
Under  Strongin's  behavioral  assumptions,  an expansionary  policy 
shock increases NBR and decreases BWR by exactly  the same amount. 
Because  demand for reserves  is inelastic,  adjustment to a new mix of 
NBR and BWR for a given quantity of TR must fall entirely to the funds 
rate. With only the funds rate free to equilibrate supply and demand for 
NBR, Strongin's  policy  effects  resemble,  in exaggerated  form,  the re- 
30.  Sims (1992). 
31.  Gordon  and Leeper (1994) impose the similarly dubious assumption  that long 
interest rates show no within-month response to monetary policy variables, which 
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Figure 8. Impulse  Response  Functions  for Strongin's  Five-Variable  Model, 
Recursive  Identification" 
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Source:  Authors'  VARs, as described  in text, using data  described  in appendix  A. 
a. For  explanation  of the figure,  see figure  3, note a. 
b. Percent  deviation  from initial level; for RF, percentage  point deviation. 
sponses  to  an  interest  rate  innovation  reported earlier  by  Sims  and 
Bernanke and Alan Blinder.32 
Figure  8 reports the dynamic  responses  over  four years to  shocks 
identified by Strongin's model.33  The third column reports responses to 
a contractionary monetary policy  disturbance.  Borrowed reserves  and 
the  federal  funds  rate move  in the  same  direction,  and the  liquidity 
effect  is very persistent.  The temporary rise in total reserves  after the 
shock is very small relative to the increase in borrowing,  implying that 
nonborrowed reserves  and the federal funds rate move  in opposite  di- 
rections.  Real  GDP decreases  dramatically.  Prices  rise  smoothly  and 
32.  Sims (1986); Bernanke  and Blinder  (1992). 
33.  The sample period  and modeling methods  used in figure  8 conform  to those in 
the rest of this paper, so our results, although  quite similar, do not match  Strongin's  in 
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steadily.  The policy  shock accounts for about half of the variability of 
output over horizons  of three or more years,  the majority of the fluc- 
tuations  in borrowed reserves,  and a substantial proportion of  funds 
rate movements in the short run. A shock to demand for reserves (shown 
in  the  second  column)  is  accommodated  almost  dollar-for-dollar  by 
open  market purchases  that raise  nonborrowed  reserves  and relieve 
banks of  the need to borrow at the discount  window.  This highlights 
the strong implication of Strongin's model that the entire positive  con- 
temporaneous correlation between  total reserves  and nonborrowed re- 
serves can be interpreted as an endogenous policy response to a banking 
sector disturbance. 
The figure reiterates a feature of policy  behavior encountered above: 
monetary policy  responds to shocks that portend higher prices by con- 
tracting reserves and raising the funds rate. This pattern holds even for 
the first P shock,  which lowers output while  it raises prices. 
The substantial and sustained  increase  in prices  following  what is 
identified as a contractionary monetary policy  shock confirms our view 
that this specification involves  unreasonable characterizations of policy 
behavior that lead to confounding inflationary supply disturbances orig- 
inating in the private sector with  what are supposed  to be exogenous 
monetary policy  disturbances. 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans add commodity  prices to Stron- 
gin's  five  variables  and relax  his  assumption  that a monetary policy 
shock only changes the composition  of a fixed quantity of total reserves. 
By allowing  some of the effect  of an increase in the supply of NBR to 
show up in an increase in the equilibrium quantity of TR, their identi- 
fication moderates the large policy  effects  found by Strongin. 
Figure 9 reports the results from Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and Ev- 
ans's  identification.  The fourth column  attributes considerably  less  of 
observed variation in RF to policy  shocks  than does  the third column 
of figure 8 (Strongin's  model).  Total reserves  rise with the expansion 
in nonborrowed reserves,  so the fall in borrowed reserves  can be less 
than the rise in nonborrowed reserves.  Output again rises persistently, 
but policy  shocks  account for only  a small fraction of  its variability. 
The price level  does  not fall  following  a monetary expansion  (recall 
that in figure 8 it rises following  a contraction); in fact, monetary policy 
shocks have essentially  no effect  on the price of finished goods.  Com- 
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Figure  9. Impulse  Response  Functions  for Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and Evans's 
Six-Variable  Model, Recursive  Identificationa 
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Source:  Authors'  VARs, as described  in text, using data  described  in appendix  A. 
a. For  explanation  of the figure,  see figure  3, note a. 
b. Percent  deviation  from initial level; for RF, percentage  point deviation. 
an expansionary  shock increases  commodity  prices as it lowers interest 
rates. 
The response of policy to information  about future inflation is as 
strong here as in the other specifications  that we have examined. The 
third column of figure 9 shows that a jump in commodity prices sig- 
naling a smoothly increasing  price level induces a smooth  tightening  of 
reserves and a smooth increase in the funds rate. The endogenous re- 
sponse of policy to production, information, and banking sector dis- 
turbances  is the dominant  source  of funds  rate  variability;  policy shocks 
account for only a small proportion  of the error  variance in the funds 
rate  .34 
34.  Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and Evans  also consider  the results  of identifying  pol- 
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Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and Evans's model produces  estimates of 
the effects of policy disturbances  that are, in themselves, believable. 
However, they are built on assumptions  about  policy behavior  and the 
reaction  of the economy to monetary  policy that  do not seem plausible. 
An Integrated Approach 
The research  that  we survey  above treats  reserves  and  MI as mutually 
exclusive in a model, probably  because of the technical  and  conceptual 
problems  of working  with models of more than six or seven variables. 
In this section we consider  two models that include both types of mon- 
etary aggregate, hoping to gain insight into how bank behavior and 
Federal  Reserve policy interact. 
Modeling Federal  Reserve  and Banking System Behavior 
It is appealing  to think that by using data on variables  directly con- 
trolled  by the Federal  Reserve (for example, reserves, the federal  funds 
rate, or the Federal  Reserve  discount  rate), together  with others  that  are 
of more direct concern to banks (such as bank loans, M2, MI, a bank 
loan rate index, or a deposit rate index), one might devise restrictions 
on which variables  have an immediate  impact  on which agent, thereby 
disentangling  the behavior  of the banking  system from that  of the Fed- 
eral Reserve. However, this enterprise is not so  straightforward  as 
separating  component sectors of the private economy, or supply and 
demand in some market. Instead of  two collections of  individually 
negligible agents, as in a competitive  supply  and  demand  model, in this 
case there is one such collection (the banks) and a single agent (the 
Federal  Reserve)  that  is concerned  with regulating  that  collection. Data 
on most aspects of  bank behavior and balance sheets are collected 
regularly  and with little delay by the Federal Reserve, as part of its 
regulatory  function. 
We therefore do not aim to model Federal Reserve behavior and 
stronger  than  when  NBR innovations  are used-as  one would expect, they fall midway 
between  the results in figures 8 and 9. This occurs because a positive funds rate inno- 
vation lowers  NBR but raises TR slightly, implying that  BWR  does not increase  dollar 
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banking  system behavior  with separate  blocks of equations.  Rather,  we 
distinguish two aspects of Federal Reserve behavior:  macroeconomic 
policy and bank  regulation. The macroeconomic  aspect represents  the 
Federal  Reserve's responsibility  for controlling  inflation  and attention 
to its effects on the overall level of economic activity. The regulatory 
aspect  represents  the Federal  Reserve's concern  that  the banking  system 
function smoothly and efficiently. In the day-to-day operation  of the 
Federal  Reserve  open market  desk, keeping  track  of the level of reserves 
and of deposit flows that generate  changes in reserve  requirements  is a 
central concern, as is the federal funds rate. Therefore  it might seem 
that any candidate  for a Federal  Reserve behavior  equation  should in- 
clude, at a minimum, a reserve  variable  and the federal  funds rate. But 
in our view, the Federal  Reserve pays attention  to reserve and deposit 
flows in the short run mainly because of their potential impact on the 
funds rate, for which it sets targets mainly in the light of  broader 
macroeconomic  conditions. It tracks shifts in reserve requirements  in 
order to accommodate  them and avoid credit market  disturbances  and 
unwanted short-run  macroeconomic impacts. We aim to define one 
equation or block of equations that reflects how the Federal Reserve 
sets the desired level of interest rates in relation to the state of the 
economy as a whole, and another  equation  or block of equations  rep- 
resents the combined behavior of the banking sector and the Federal 
Reserve in relating  reserves to deposit flows. 
We model the behavior of the Federal Reserve as not depending 
directly-within  the month-on  final goods prices, output, or GDP 
components, on the grounds  that  these variables  can be measured  only 
with substantial  delay. In principle, we think it reasonable to allow 
Federal  Reserve behavior  to depend  within the month  on financial  mar- 
ket variables  that might serve as indicators  of the state of the economy 
and that are observable  on a daily basis-for  example, the value of the 
dollar, a stock price index, long interest rates, or a commodity price 
index. However, there is an argument  for imposing a lag even on the 
effects of these policy variables. Significant  shifts in the Federal Re- 
serve's macroeconomic  policy stance  require  a time-consuming  process 
of consultation, analysis, and consensus building. We consider speci- 
fications  both with currently  observable  financial  variables  included in 
the Federal  Reserve's reaction  function  contemporaneously  and  without 
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Allowing for a possible response by monetary  policy to market  in- 
terest rates raises some difficulties. To understand  them, consider a 
very simple model. Suppose that policy sets a one-period  interest  rate 
r(t), responding  to an indicator  x(t) of the state of the economy, plus a 
random  disturbance  E(t).  There  is a continuously  observable  two-period 
interest rate R(t), which is related to r(t) by considerations  of term 
structure.  There is also, however, a component  of the spread  between 
the two rates, v(t), that may reflect institutional  frictions. 
Formally, we are supposing 
(4)  policy:  r(t)  =  ot0x(t) +  aox(t  -  1) +  yR(t) +  E(t) 
(5)  arbitrage:  R(t)  =  -(r(t)  +  E,[r(t +  1)])  +  v(t). 
2 
To complete the system, the time-series properties  of x and v must be 
specified. Assume that  v is serially independent  and  x is autoregressive, 
according  to 
(6)  x(t)  =  Ox(t -  1)  +  t(t). 
Substituting  equation  5 into equation  4 gives 
(7)  r(t)  = 
2 
VLoX(t)  +  o,x(t-  1)  +  E(t)  +  -  v(t)  +  E,r(t +  1). 
'Y  2 
In order  for the system to have a unique solution, 
y  _ 
(8)  =  _  <1, 
which is equivalent  to y <  1. This points to an inherent  drawback  in a 
monetary  policy that  reacts  systematically  to market  interest  rates. Mar- 
kets depend  on policy to fix a path for nominal  interest  rates. A policy 
authority  that is too sensitive to market  rates can create indeterminacy 
by essentially abandoning  its role of anchoring  the term structure.  In 
this model, it seems easy to avoid such a situation, since the condition 
that y <  1 is simple and understandable.  But if the policy authority 
were responding  to several rates and to other auctioned  market  prices 
that are sensitive to interest rates, it might not be so clear that the 
boundary  of indeterminacy  was being crossed. 42  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
Using equation  6 to solve equation  7 forward  leads to 
(9)  r(t)  = 
2  ii  -  ot,i  x(t)  +  x(tf  1)1+ 
2 
E(t)  +  4v(t). 
One can also substitute  equation  9 in equation  5 to produce 
i  o(I+  0) +  U~(l  +  02i) 
(10)  R(t)  =  -  1o  -  04  x()0 
+  oIx(t -  1)j +  E  (t)  +  +  +)v(t). 
If all that is known about the policy reaction  function is that it has the 
form of equation  4, there  is an identification  problem.  Any linear  trans- 
formation  of the pair of equations  9 and 10 that gives the disturbances 
in the two equations  an identity  covariance  matrix  will result  in a system 
that satisfies the basic restrictions  for an identified  VAR, but in which 
both equations  have the form of equation  4-a  linear equation  in r(t), 
R(t), x(t), and x(t -  1). There will be some versions of the system in 
which one equation  has a scalar  multiple  of E as a disturbance,  but also 
some versions in which one equation  has a scalar multiple of v as the 
disturbance.  If these two equations were part of a larger model, one 
might allow for other variables  to enter the equations, restrict  the way 
in which they enter  the two equations, and  think, on this basis, that  one 
had identified the two equations. But if,  in fact, the other variables 
were not important,  one would have an unidentified,  or weakly identi- 
fied model. One would then run the risk of labeling an arbitrage  con- 
dition as a policy rule and of confusing fluctuations  in term risk pre- 
miums with policy disturbances. 
As we have set this model out, it is hard to see why the policy 
authority  should want  to react  to R. We have assumed  that  the authority 
can observe and react to the state of the economy, x, as rapidly as do 
asset markets. All that the authority  accomplishes by reacting to R is 
to make r depend on the term risk premium,  v, in addition  to x(t) and 
x(t -  1). Given that  R contains  no important  information  that  the policy 
authority  cannot access directly, it seems unlikely that the authority 
would react to it. Furthermore,  even if it did react to R, one would not 
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the policy reaction function not to contain R, one would emerge with 
estimates of equation  9 rather  than  of equation  4. The disturbance  term 
in (9),  though, is likely to be almost the same as that in (4).  It is 
reasonable  to think that month-to-month  variation  generated  by policy 
in the short rate is substantially  larger  than month-to-month  variation 
in the term  risk premium.35  Thus, since 4 and y are both less than  one, 
the error term in equation 9 is dominated  by variation in E.  In other 
words, even if, by constraining  y to zero in equation  4, one mistakenly 
estimates  (9), one will come pretty  close to recovering  the actual  policy 
disturbance  process and thus also to recovering the policy reaction 
function. 
The policy authority  would have stronger  reason  to make y nonzero 
if it had an information  disadvantage;  that is, if it was constrained  to 
keep o0 =  0 in equation  4. Then, by reacting  to R, the authority  could 
in effect make r(t) sensitive to x(t),  despite its inability to observe 
current  x directly. However, in these circumstances,  imposing  the con- 
straint  that y is equal to zero would firmly  identify the system. 
This discussion suggests that  one should be on the lookout for iden- 
tification  problems  when trying to model several interest  rates  jointly. 
It makes sense to experiment with identification  schemes that allow 
policy reactions to several longer interest rates and exclude current 
policy reactions to variables that are observed only with a delay. But 
such schemes may fail, unable  to distinguish  between policy equations 
and  arbitrage  conditions. In that  case, one might obtain  good results  by 
allowing current  values of a single interest rate in the policy reaction 
function. 
It should be recognized that the criterion  for including  interest  rates 
in the reaction  function is not the degree to which they improve  the fit 
of a least-squares  regression. In this simple model, including  current  R 
on the right-hand  side in a least-squares  estimate of a policy reaction 
function will generally improve the fit and, indeed, will produce an 
estimate of that linear combination  of equation  9 and 10 in which the 
disturbance  is orthogonal  to the disturbance  in equation 10. If, as is to 
be expected, v is small, this will be an approximate  estimate of the 
35.  Although  this is quite plausible when one considers as the long rate that on a 
three-month  Treasury  bill, for example, and as the short  rate, that on federal  funds, it 
may be more dubious when one thinks of the long rate as that on a ten-year  Treasury 
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arbitrage  relationship,  almost  unrelated  to the policy reaction  function. 
Clearly  a multivariate  approach,  with careful  attention  to simultaneity, 
is important  in order  to avoid serious error  in this context.36 
Through  much of our sample period, the behavior of one or more 
monetary  aggregates  was a focus of attention.  All of our  models include 
at least one monetary  aggregate  in the Federal  Reserve macroeconomic 
policy equation.  A monetary  aggregate  will also appear  in the equations 
describing the determination  of reserves jointly by bank and Federal 
Reserve behavior, representing  the impact  of deposit flows on required 
reserves. 
As in our previous specifications  of small models, a block that we 
label P sets "sluggish" private  sector variables, which do not respond 
immediately to financial signals. There is also a block, labeled I, of 
private  sector variables  that  are  set in auction  markets  and  that  we allow 
to depend  contemporaneously  on everything  in the system. Before dis- 
cussing further  issues in model specification, we consider the two sets 
of exclusion restrictions  on AO  for which we present  estimates below. 
We consider one model with thirteen  variables and a second, con- 
taining more banking sector variables, with eighteen variables. Table 
1 displays the identification  scheme for our smaller  model. The varia- 
bles in the model include both a consumer-level monetary  aggregate 
(MI) and total reserves. We also include CPI, Y, the unemployment 
rate (U), consumption  (C), and both residential  and nonresidential  in- 
vestnient (IR and INR, respectively), allowing us to assess the plausi- 
bility of responses to monetary  policy disturbances  in some detail. We 
avoid the complications  of having  multiple  short  rates  in the same model 
by including only the three-month  Treasury  bill rate (R3). In addition, 
we include four information  variables  that are observed without delay 
and might influence  Federal  Reserve behavior:  the Standard  and  Poor's 
500 stock price index (S), the ten-year Treasury  bond rate (RIO), a 
commodity price index (PC), and an index of the value of the dollar 
36.  Our approach  is clearly different from that of most of the empirical reaction 
function literature  (for example, Khoury, 1990) in two respects. One concerns our 
immediate  objectives. We are not primarily  interested  in explaining or understanding 
Federal Reserve behavior;  we need to model systematic aspects of Federal Reserve 
behavior  in order  to estimate  accurately  how Federal  Reserve  actions  affect  the economy. 
The other is the difference in method  that is apparent  in this section. Our framework 
makes  it evident  that  there  are identification  problems  in estimating  policy behavior  that 
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(DOL). The rows and columns of the table correspond  to the rows and 
columns of AO. The Xs indicate coefficients that have been left free. 
The fractional  entries (0.3X throughout  this table) indicate  coefficients 
that have been given smaller  prior  standard  deviations than the coeffi- 
cients corresponding  to Xs. These entries  can be thought  of as soft zero 
restrictions. We initially estimated  the model with the prior  covariance 
matrix  determined  by the matrix  in table 1 (see appendix  B for details). 
However, both  in this model and  in the larger  one that  we discuss below, 
we found that when the soft zero restrictions  were used, the shape of 
the likelihood was highly non-Gaussian,  which created  numerical  dif- 
ficulties in constructing  confidence  bands for the impulse responses.37 
When we replaced the soft zeros with hard zeros, the non-Gaussian 
characteristics  were greatly  diminished, without  substantial  changes in 
the estimated impulse responses. Therefore  our figures  present  results 
for a model with zeros in place of all fractional  entries in table 1. 
The first two equations in the model, both labeled F/B, combine 
banking system and Federal Reserve behavior and are normalized  by 
setting the AO  coefficient of R3 in the second equation  to zero.38 In this 
specification, the Federal  Reserve is modeled  as never responding  con- 
temporaneously  to variables  other  than  TR  or M1. This applies even to 
available information,  such as PC or RIO. The results are almost un- 
changed if PC is allowed to enter the first two equations  contempora- 
neously. The P block is a standard  list of nonfinancial  private sector 
variables, with the addition  of M1. 
In this model, consumer-level  demand  for MI is taken  to be interest- 
37.  Since we generate  error  bands  by simulation  methods, it may not be clear why 
a non-Gaussian  shape  causes us difficulty.  We use importance  sampling  methods,  which 
require  that one be able to generate  random  draws efficiently from a reasonably  good 
approximation  to the actual probability  density function  under  examination  (for a dis- 
cussion, see Gelman and others, 1995). With soft zeros, the likelihood has multiple 
peaks  and  nonlinear  ridges, very non-Gaussian  characteristics.  Gaussian  approximations 
to this form are so bad that  importance  sampling  is prohibitively  inefficient,  and we did 
not have time to program  special methods  for the particular  shapes  that  we encountered. 
We should note that, although  we have found multiple  peaks, these tend either  to have 
qualitatively  similar  impulse  responses  or to have much lower likelihood  than  the ones 
that  we summarize  here with impulse  responses. 
38.  In fact, the estimated  coefficient on R3 in the second equation  is close to zero 
in any case. Thus the results  are almost  identical  if, instead,  the coefficient  on TR  in the 
first equation is  set to zero, which might be more natural  if that equation is to be 
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insensitive within the month;  MI is a private-sector  sluggish variable 
like CPI and Y. We would not defend this specification  as necessarily 
correct; we use it as a working hypothesis. Results are almost com- 
pletely unchanged  if, while excluding PC, one allows R3 to enter all 
equations of  the P block, as would be appropriate  if  there were a 
traditional  money demand  equation  in the system-involving  R3, MI, 
CPI, and  Y  contemporaneously-and if the disturbances  in that  equation 
were correlated  with other shocks to the P sector. In that case,  the 
triangularizing  orthogonalization  that we have imposed on the P block 
would spread  R3 coefficients over the whole block, even if the money 
demand  alone contained  R3. 
The I sector relates the four information  variables  to all the others, 
without delay. The P sector is allowed to depend contemporaneously 
on PC,  on the grounds that one aspect of  sluggish behavior, price 
markup  rules, might create such a direct dependence. 
There  are two other  variations  on this specification  that  leave results 
unaffected: allowing U into the F/B block equations, and excluding 
both PC and R3 from the P block equations. The pattern  of responses 
to the first  two shocks is largely  unchanged  if one replaces  total reserves 
adjusted  for reserve requirements  (TR) with unadjusted  total reserves 
(TRU). The sixth column does show less tendency for oscillating re- 
sponses when TRU  replaces  TR, however. There  are  also variations  that 
substantially  change the pattern  of results, which we discuss below, 
after the results. The results are presented  in figure 10. 
The first  column of figure 10, which, according  to the motivation  for 
our scheme of restrictions  on AO.  ought to reflect disturbances  to the 
macroeconomic  policy concerns of the Federal  Reserve, shows effects 
on the economy consonant with its interpretation  as a monetary  con- 
traction.  Short and long  interest rates rise,  reserves  and MI fall 
smoothly, output  falls and  unemployment  rises, GDP components  fall, 
commodity prices drop smoothly, and the value of the dollar initially 
jumps and then continues smoothly upward.  Figure 11 shows the first 
column  of figure 10 on a larger  scale, with error  bands. The error  bands 
are 68 percent  probability  bands, roughly one standard  error  on either 
side of the impulse  response. As can be seen, most of the responses  are 
rather  sharply  estimated. The CPI response, although  very small, ap- 
pears to be more than two standard  deviations away from zero in the 
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Figure 10. Impulse  Response  Functions  for a Thirteen-Variable  Model, 
Nonrecursive  Identificationa 
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Source:  Authors'  VARs, as described  in text, using data described  in appendix  A. 
a. For explanation of the figure, see figure 3, note a; note, however, that there are no error bands in the present figure. 
Identification is given in table I. 
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Figure 11. Responses  to a Contractionary  Monetary  Policy Shock, 
Thirteen-Variable  Model, 
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Source:  Authors'  VARs, as described  in text, using data  described  in appendix  A. 
a. This figure  presents  a blown-up  view of the first  column of figure 10, with the addition  of error  bands. 
b. Percent  deviation  from initial level; for R3, U, and  RIO,  percentage  point deviation. Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  51 
however.  The commodity  price response is negative  at all dates and is 
roughly two standard deviations  away from zero over much of its four- 
year span. 
The second column  shows  how a model that uses reserves as single 
monetary aggregate can be treacherous: it appears to reflect the Federal 
Reserve's  accommodation  of  shifts  in  demand  for  reserves  that are 
unrelated to movements  in Ml.  (This  result does  not change  notably 
when TRU replaces  TR). Perhaps surprisingly,  this variation does  not 
consist primarily of variation in excess  reserves; required reserves move 
quite closely  in line with total reserves.  The variation apparently arises 
from shifts  in the composition  of deposits  among categories  with dif- 
ferent reserve requirements. 
The third column  of figure 10 is identified as a private sector shock 
and moves  Ml  and TR in the same direction.  In this model,  we do not 
try to separate money demand disturbances from other P sector disturb- 
ances,  and this column,  because  it shows  a rise in CPI,  does  not look 
like a pure money  demand shock.  Regardless  of its exact nature, it is 
clear that this disturbance is the most important single  source of varia- 
tion in both Ml  and TR and that there is nothing in its estimated form 
to indicate that the model allocates  it to the P sector in error. This is a 
disturbance  that expands  the  money  supply  and raises  interest  rates 
without affecting  output. It seems  unlikely  that it mistakenly  incorpo- 
rates much of  an expansionary  monetary policy  disturbance.  The fact 
that the  model  is  led  by  the  data  to  allocate  so  much  variation  in 
monetary aggregates to nonpolicy  disturbances shows why use of mon- 
etary aggregates as one-dimensional  policy  indicators is unsatisfactory. 
In each of the CPI, Y, and U rows of figure 10, the first two columns, 
corresponding  to  monetary  policy  and banking  system  disturbances, 
account for only a modest portion of overall variation. For CPI, in fact, 
the first two columns  make a negligible  contribution.  This model  will 
not admit an interpretation of the sample period as one in which erratic 
shifts in monetary policy  were the prime source of recessions  and re- 
coveries  or of episodes  of inflation and disinflation. 
Across the nonpolicy  columns  of figure 10, every column in which 
there  is  substantial  movement  in  the  Treasury  bill  rate  (R3)  shows 
movement  in  the  same  direction  by  CPI  and PC.  Only  in  the  first 
monetary policy  column do interest rates and either of the price varia- 
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gests both that none of the other columns are heavily contaminated with 
monetary  policy  shock  components  and that a  large  fraction  of  the 
variance  of  interest  rates must be  attributed to  systematic  policy  re- 
sponses to the threat of inflation, not to erratic fluctuations in monetary 
policy.  Once again, for the reasons discussed  in the section on method, 
this  type  of  conclusion  is  robust  to  variations  in  the  identification 
scheme. 
Table  2 displays  the identification  scheme  for an eighteen-variable 
model that deletes  C and R3 from the thirteen-variable model and adds 
the Federal Reserve  discount rate (RD),  the federal funds rate, hourly 
wage  earnings (W),  and the following  variables related to the banking 
sector:  an  index  of  rates  on  M2  deposits  (RM2),  bank  holdings  of 
securities  (BS),  bank loans  (BL),  and the prime interest rate (RL). As 
described  for the smaller model,  we  initially  estimated  with soft zero 
constraints  as shown  in the table  and obtained reasonable  point  esti- 
mates, but encountered numerical difficulties  in producing error bands. 
Once  again,  converting  the  soft  zeros  to  hard zeros  eliminated  the 
numerical  difficulties  while  leaving  the  nature of  the  results  largely 
unchanged.  All of our figures therefore present results for the hard zero 
version of the model. 
We display  the impulse  responses  in figure 12. Because  two of the 
interest  rates in  this  model-the  federal  funds  rate and the  discount 
rate-are  naturally thought of  as set by the Federal Reserve,  the first 
two columns  of the figure should be interpreted as responses  to policy 
disturbances.  They  are similar to the first column  of  figure  10 in the 
rows in which  the variables  are comparable,  but in figure 12, the first 
column apparently represents a short-lived tightening of policy  and the 
second,  a longer-lived  one.  Because  the two policy  shocks  are distin- 
guished only by an arbitrary  normalization,  "policy  shocks"  could take 
the form of any linear combination  of these two columns. 
Figure  13 shows  the responses  to the two columns  of policy  shocks 
on a larger scale,  with 68 percent error bands. The responses in the first 
column  are fairly  sharply determined,  although  slightly  less  sharply 
than the responses  in the smaller model.  Most of the responses  in the 
second  column  leave  a zero response  within the range of high proba- 
bility,  except  for  interest  rates.  The  disturbance  in  the  first column 
generates  an outflow  of  Ml  deposits,  offset  initially  by  a decline  in 
bank securities  and, later, by a decline  in bank loans.  This seems to be 66666  ~  :  C)  :)  6 
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Figure 12. Impulse  Response  Functions  for an Eighteen-Variable  Model, 
Nonrecursive  Identificationa 
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Source: Authors' VARs, as described in text, using data described in appendtx A. 
a.  For explanation of the figure, see figure 3.  note a, not, however, that there are no error bands in the present figure. 
Identification is given in table 2. 
b. Percent deviation from initial level; for RF, RD, RM2, RL, U, and RIO, percentage point deviation. Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  55 
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Figure 13. Responses  to Two Contractionary  Monetary  Policy Shocks, 
Eighteen-Variable  Modela 
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a reasonable  pattern  for the banking system's response to a monetary 
contraction and thus reinforces the plausibility of our identification. 
The fact that  RF and  RD move with  different  patterns  in the two columns 
shows that the two variables  have considerable  independent  variation. 
But there seems to be only one column's worth of substantial  non- 
interest  rate  effects. A policy action that  moved  RF and  RD in the same 
direction by about the same amount  would have effects that approxi- 
mately summed  across  the two columns  of figure 13. For the most part, 
they would be slightly stronger  than  those shown in the first  column of 
the figure, but not very different  overall. 
In figure 12, as in figure 10, one column accounts for much of the 
variance of MI and reserves and shows them moving in the same di- 
rection  and  also in the same direction  as interest  rates. This is the eighth 
column in figure 12, but the first in the P sector. 
Prices and interest rates move in the same direction in response to 
nearly all disturbances,  as they do in the smaller model. In this case, 
though, there is one disturbance  in the I sector (the seventeenth  col- 
umn), in addition  to the main policy disturbance,  that moves interest 
rates up and prices down. This disturbance  seems to have negligible 
real effects. It involves a sharp,  temporary  movement  in long rates  that 
seems out of proportion  to the small associated movements  in RF and 
RD. Nonetheless, from  the form  of the responses,  this disturbance  could 
possibly be contaminated  with a monetary  policy shock component. 
These results are basically easy to defend, but we would add a note 
of caution. We are not sure of the implications  of the numerical  diffi- 
culties in the less restricted  models, which we initially thought more 
plausible than  these. It could be that  when we resolve these difficulties 
we will see that  there is much more statistical  uncertainty  in our results 
than  this presentation  would suggest. Also, we have experimented  with 
a version of the larger model that includes the three-month  Treasury 
bill rate in addition  to the federal  funds rate. This version proves quite 
capable  of producing  the kind  of identification  confusion  that  we discuss 
above in the context of our example model, equations  4 and 5. A fitted 
model that looked reasonable  enough might, after some small change 
in specification or sample period, show impulse response rotation- 
what looked like a monetary  policy shock might emerge as an I sector 
shock, while the shock formally identified  as a monetary  policy shock 
might cease to make sense. This is exactly the pattern  that one would 58  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
expect if the Treasury  bill rate were linked to the federal funds rate 
by term structure  arbitrage  relationships  and contained  little informa- 
tion of use to policy authorities. As we point out above, under such 
circumstances,  inclusion of the Treasury  bill rate can weaken identifi- 
cation without  improving  the accuracy  of the model. We therefore  feel 
justified  in responding  to these difficulties  by considering  a model with- 
out the Treasury  bill rate; but it would clearly be more satisfactory  to 
find a way to model the two short rates jointly and maintain  robust 
identification. 
Conclusion 
This paper  is clearly far from the last word on the issues discussed, 
even in the context of identified  VAR research.  It remains  quite possi- 
ble, for example, that we are still attributing  to policy disturbances 
some variation  that actually originates in adverse supply shocks. This 
would tend  to diminish  the estimated  price-reducing  effects of monetary 
contraction  and  exaggerate  the estimated  output-reducing  effects. With 
similar  methods  but smaller  models, Soyoung  Kim finds  very small real 
effects and  larger  price effects using data  for other  countries,  and  David 
Cushman  and Tao Zha, exploiting the identification  possibilities that 
arise for a small open economy, also find small real effects.39 
Nonetheless, we believe that our estimates have some chance of 
being right. Using a larger modeling framework makes possible a 
clearer  understanding  of the identification  problems  and greater  confi- 
dence in interpreting  results, since we trace effects across a wider 
variety of variables. We believe that we establish quite firmly  the un- 
reliability of identifications  that treat a monetary  aggregate-whether 
reserves or an M variable-as  moving mainly in response to policy 
disturbances  in the short run. The bulk of the movements in both ag- 
gregates arise from policy accommodating  shifts in private sector de- 
mand. Further,  we confirm that most movements in monetary  policy 
instruments  are responses to the state of the economy, not random 
deviations from the usual patterns  of behavior  of the monetary  author- 
ities. To policy analysts, accustomed  to basing  policy recommendations 
39.  Soyoung Kim (1996); Cushman  and Zha (forthcoming). Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  59 
on current  and expected economic conditions, this finding  is surely not 
surprising,  but it should  be disturbing.  It implies that  close attention  to 
modeling the policy-setting process is essential to accurate  statistical 
assessment of the effects of policy.  Much existing empirical policy 
modeling ignores, or treats casually, the implications  of policy endo- 
geneity. We hope that we demonstrate  that careful treatment  of policy 
endogeneity is feasible, as well as important. 
APPENDIX  A 
Data 
ALL  VARIABLES  are monthly time series covering July 1959  through 
March 1996. Unless otherwise indicated, all calculations  described  in 
the text are for the period January  1960 through  March 1996, so that 
the data allow inclusion of a six-period lag. Underlying  data for some 
variables  are quarterly;  in those cases, we interpolate  using the proce- 
dure described in Chow and Lin (1971). Calculations  use natural  logs 
of all variables, except interest  rate  variables  and the variable  U. In the 
figures, however, scales present percentage  (or percentage  point) de- 
viations of underlying  variables, not log variables. 
The following variables  use data  obtained  directly  from  the Board  of 
Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System: 
BL  Total loans and leases at all commercial  banks, seasonally 
adjusted,  billions  of dollars. 
BS  Securities  at all commercial  banks. Computed  as total loans 
and securities  less total loans and leases at all commercial 
banks, seasonally  adjusted,  billions  of dollars. 
BWR  Borrowed  reserves.  Calculated  by the authors  as ln(TRINBR). 
Ml  MI money stock, seasonally  adjusted,  billions  of dollars. 
RD  Discount  window  borrowing  rate  at the Federal  Reserve  Bank 
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RF  Federal  funds  rate  (effective  rate),  percent. 
RL  Prime  rate  on short-term  business  loans. Computed  as average 
of daily figures,  percent. 
RM2  Deposit-weighted  average  percent  return  on M2 deposits. 
RR  Required  reserves, adjusted  for breaks  due to changes in re- 
serve requirements,  seasonally  adjusted,  billions  of dollars. 
R3  Three-month  Treasury  bill rate, from the secondary  market, 
percent. 
RIO  Ten-year  Treasury  bond  rate,  constant  maturity,  from  the sec- 
ondary  market,  percent. 
S  Standard  and  Poor's  500 composite  stock  price  index, 1943 = 
100. 
TR  Total reserves, adjusted  for breaks  due to changes  in reserve 
requirements,  seasonally  adjusted,  billions  of dollars. 
TRU  Total reserves, not adjusted  for breaks  due to changes  in re- 
serve requirements,  seasonally  adjusted,  billions  of dollars. 
The following variables  use data from other sources: 
C  Personal  consumption  expenditures,  seasonally  adjusted,  bil- 
lions of chain 1992  dollars.  Source:  Bureau  of Economic  Anal- 
ysis, National  Income  and  Product  Accounts  (NIPA). 
CPI  Consumer  price index for urban  consumers  (CPI-U), season- 
ally adjusted  index, 1982-84 =  100. Source:  Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics  (BLS). 
DOL  Trade-weighted  value of the U.S. dollar,  index, 1980 =  100. 
Source:  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Atlanta. 
INR  Real private  nonresidential  fixed investment,  seasonally  ad- 
justed, billions of chain 1992 dollars.  Source:  NIPA. Interpo- 
lated  using monthly  data  on real value of new construction  of 
privately  owned nonresidential  industrial  structures  (from  the 
Bureau  of Economic  Analysis [BEA]);  total equipment  com- 
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equipment  component  of industrial  production,  intermediate 
products  and business supplies  component  of industrial  pro- 
duction  (from  the Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve 
System);  and  manufacturers'  shipments  to capital  goods indus- 
tries, and  manufacturers'  shipments  of construction  materials, 
supplies,  and intermediate  products  (from  the BEA). 
IR  Real  residential  fixed  investment,  seasonally  adjusted,  billions 
of chain 1992 dollars. Source: NIPA. Interpolated  using 
monthly  data  on housing  starts,  manufacturers'  shipments  of 
construction  materials,  supplies, intermediate  products, and 
real value of new construction  of privately  owned residential 
buildings  (from the BEA); and construction  supplies  compo- 
nent  of industrial  production  (from  the Board  of Governors  of 
the Federal  Reserve  System). 
PC  International  Monetary  Fund's index of world commodity 
prices. Source: International Financial Statistics. 
PCM  Crude  materials  component  of the producer  price index, sea- 
sonally  adjusted  index, 1982 =  100. Source:  BLS. 
U  Civilian unemployment  rate, seasonally adjusted, percent. 
Source:  BLS. 
W  Wage earnings,  seasonally  adjusted,  dollars  per hour. Source: 
data  from  1964  onward  are  from  the  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics, 
Employment and Earnings.  Pre-1964  data are based on  our 
regressions,  using actual  manufacturing  data for 1959-63 as 
explanatory  variables. 
Y  Real  GDP, seasonally  adjusted,  billions  of chain 1992 dollars. 
Source:  NIPA. Interpolated  using  monthly  data  on total  indus- 
trial  production  (from  the Board  of Governors  of the Federal 
Reserve  System),  civilian  employment  for age sixteen  years  or 
older (from  the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  Employment  Situ- 
tation), retail sales (from the BEA) deflated by consumer 
prices, real personal  consumption  expenditures  (from  NIPA), 
and the National  Association  of Purchasing  Managers'  Com- 
posite Index. 62  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2.1996 
APPENDIX  B 
The Prior 
THIS APPENDIX outlines our approach.  For sufficient  detail on the prior 
to actually use our methods, and for an appreciation  of the numerical 
and mathematical  considerations  that lead us to this particular  form, 
see Sims and Zha (1996). 
We postulate  a  joint normal  prior,  initially  with a diagonal  covariance 
matrix, on the elements of AO  that are not constrained  to zero. In the 
case of reduced form models, we choose an ordering  of the variables 
that constrains  AO  to be triangular,  an exactly identified  normalization. 
We then specify a joint normal prior on all the coefficients in A, 
s >  0,  conditional  on AO.  To make the prior  center  on specifications  in 
which reduced  form models for individual  variables  are random  walks, 
we make the conditional mean of Al  IAO  be AO  itself, while the condi- 
tional mean of AsIAo, s >  1 is zero. The prior standard  deviations of 
the elements of the AS  matrices  shrink  as s increases, and  these elements 
are initially taken as uncorrelated.  It may seem that this approach- 
constructing  the prior from a marginal  on AO  and a conditional distri- 
bution for AsIA0, s >  1-is  roundabout  and complicated, but it turns 
out to be critical to making the method numerically  feasible in large 
models. 
On this base prior we layer additional  components, constructed  as 
dummy observations. The dummy observations induce correlations 
across elements of A in the prior. The dummy  observations  express the 
belief that  no-change  forecasts  of the model's variables  are likely to be 
quite good. Of special note is that in large dynamic systems like this, 
the phenomenon  that  produces  the well-known  bias toward  stationarity 
in least-squares  estimators  produces a bias toward  deterministic  com- 
ponents of the model explaining implausibly  large fractions  of the his- 
torically  observed  variation  in the data. We find  that  this type of dummy 
observation  also expresses the belief that  models that  explain too much 
with deterministic  components are implausible. It appears  that using 
such dummy  observations  is essential in order  to obtain  sensible results 
in models of this scale, yet conventional  time-series diagnostic  testing 
might not reveal this bias at work (this point is discussed further  in 
Sims and Zha, 1996). Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  63 
Although  these priors  may seem complicated,  they are  not influential 
on the character  of the results. In small models, in which the bias toward 
excessively strong deterministic  components  is not great, a flat prior 
and our prior  produce  quite similar  results. Our  prior  tends to make the 
estimated impulse responses smoother, without  changing their overall 
form. We do not manipulate  the prior to make results look more rea- 
sonable, except in the case of the soft zero constraints  in the prior on 
A,  as discussed in the text. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert E.  Hall: This is roughly the fifteenth anniversary  of Sims's 
original promulgation  of the vector autoregression  as a tool for macro- 
economic research.  ' For a while, it seemed that  the VAR was mainly a 
vehicle for unproductive  data  mining. Little attention  was paid to iden- 
tification-arbitrary triangular  restrictions  were assumed. One heard  a 
lot of stories, not much science. But Sims himself was never a story- 
teller. In its second decade, the VAR came into its own as a research 
tool. Careful  attention  to identification,  based on reasonable  economic 
theory, has become the standard.  In addition  to Sims himself, the lead- 
ers in this area have been Olivier Blanchard,  Mark  Watson, and Ben 
Bernanke. 
This paper, with Leeper and Zha, is a comprehensive  review of the 
evidence on the role of monetary  policy in the identified  VAR frame- 
work. The two questions considered  in the paper  are:  How large is the 
spontaneous  random  element of monetary  policy? And how much of 
the movement of real GDP can be attributed  to the spontaneous  com- 
ponent? 
Let me say something  about  the econometric  framework  used in the 
paper. The basic statistical  model is 
y =  CE, 
where y is a vector of observed innovations in key macroeconomic 
variables;  E is a vector of underlying  fundamental  driving forces, in- 
1. Sims (1980b). 
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cluding the spontaneous  elements  of monetary  policy; and  C is a matrix 
showing the dependence  of the variables  on the driving forces. 
Another  way to write this class of models is 
Ay=  E, 
where A is C',  the matrix  of the structural  relations  among the varia- 
bles. Suppose that  A (or, equivalently, C) is known-that  is, suppose 
that theory tells one how each driving force affects each observed 
macroeconomic  variable. The covariance  matrix  of the innovations,  fQ 
=  V(y), can be directly observed. It is left to infer the covariance 
matrix of the underlying driving forces, E  V(E). This can be re- 
covered directly from 
A'V(y)A  =  A'fQA  = 
Also, one can recover the values of the driving forces from 
E  =  Ay. 
Note that the covariance matrix E  has N(N  -  1)/2 distinct off- 
diagonals. One can calculate, rather  than assume, this many elements 
of A, if one assumes that these covariances are zero. As the authors 
mention, this assumption  is standard  in the VAR approach,  whereas it 
is not generally made within the traditional  simultaneous equations 
framework. 
If one takes the hard  line that one knows all of the structural  coeffi- 
cients, in either the C sense or the A sense, then one can answer the 
two questions immediately:  one can calculate the driving forces, in- 
cluding random  money, and  calculate  the part  of the movements  of real 
GDP that are attributable  to that component  (and to each of the other 
components). 
Note that when one considers C or A known, one does not impose 
the restriction  that the driving forces be uncorrelated  with each other. 
When  one calculates  the covariance  matrix  of the driving  forces, it will 
have nonzero off-diagonal elements. This is where the computational 
effort and  econometric  excitement  come in. One can use the assumption 
that the N(N -  1)/2 distinct off-diagonal elements of the covariance 
matrix are zero in order to determine  the values of that many of the 
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knowledge, derived from theory, to determine  the remaining  elements 
of C or A. 
The natural  framework  for handling  prior  information  is that  of Baye- 
sian statistics. This paper  is a pioneering  effort to apply  Bayesian  think- 
ing to the VAR framework.  It does so in two ways. First, it imposes 
mildly held beliefs that the coefficients in the C or A matrices  are not 
too large, and that the most likely forecast is that the current  values of 
the variables will be the same as the lagged values. This procedure 
tames the tendency for VARs with many variables to overfit the data 
and have implausible  dynamics. 
Second, following my suggestion at the Brookings Panel meeting, 
the authors  experiment  with prior  restrictions  on the A matrix  that are 
less than  fully dogmatic.  These soft zero  restrictions  result  in intractable 
numerical  problems, however. For the moment, it is necessary to be 
completely dogmatic about the crucial restrictions that identify the 
model and make it possible to give names to the shocks. Either one 
knows for sure that  a coefficient has a particular  value, usually zero, or 
one does not have a clue. 
The paper's econometric framework  is well suited to dealing with 
the authors'  basic questions. The coefficient matrices,  A or C, tell what 
part of an observed monetary  variable (an element of y, such as Ml, 
reserves, or interest  rates)  is induced  by other  forces (other  components 
of e)  and what is the result of the spontaneous  component. There are 
some hints that it would be interesting  to look at upper  bounds on the 
size and importance  of the spontaneous  element. Although  this idea is 
not really formulated  or pursued  in the paper, I think it should be. 
The spontaneous  element of a monetary  variable cannot be larger, 
one might suppose, than  the innovation  in that variable. A model with 
only zeroes in the row of C that corresponds  to the monetary  variable, 
except for the element corresponding  to the spontaneous  element of 
monetary  policy, provides a bound  on the size of the spontaneous  ele- 
ment of monetary  policy. This is exactly what the models of figures 3, 
4, and 6 do-the  triangular  models. They show that  even if the mone- 
tary variable is taken as either MI or total reserves and its innovation 
is taken  to be completely spontaneous,  the random  element  nonetheless 
has little role in the movement  of real GDP. 
If the point of the paper were only to show that the spontaneous 
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here. All the rest of the paper  works  on removing  from  monetary  policy 
variables the portion that is induced by current  developments in the 
economy. That is unnecessary  for the main thesis. 
The first attempt  to deal with the induced element of the monetary 
variables  relies on the restrictions  in the first  informal  table, with results 
given in figure  5. There  is a problem  here, and  in all seriously identified 
VARs, whose solution escapes me. The restrictions  in this table are 
stated  in terms  of the  A matrix,  which shows how the observed  variables 
interact  with one another.  The basic question, and much of the discus- 
sion, relate to its inverse, the C matrix. The zero restrictions  in the 
table map into complicated  restrictions  on C. The problem  shows up in 
the first  column, where  the names  of the E impulses  are  listed alongside 
those of the variables:  the names  of variables  and  impulses  are  carefully 
distinguished. What one would like to know, but cannot completely 
figure out from the table, are the restrictions  on the way each impulse 
enters each observed variable. 
The authors' restrictions, asserted with dogmatic certainty, are 
hardly  compelling. Those on the upper  right  say that  neither  money nor 
interest rates affect output or prices in the same month. They do not 
claim that the immediate effect is small, but that it is strictly zero. 
Those on the lower left say that there is no response induced  in money 
by output or price developments in the same month. I agree that the 
within-month  effects of money and interest on output and prices are 
probably  fairly small, but that does not make them literally zero. And 
I have an even stronger  suspicion that the Fed gets some inkling about 
output  and prices within the month  and responds  to that inkling. 
Again, the identification  comes from  the certain  knowledge  that  these 
four restrictions  are true. It must not be interpreted  as a belief that the 
effects are small, because "small" would have to be judged in relation 
to other  effects whose magnitude  cannot  be known without  the restric- 
tions. This underscores  the potential  value of a full Bayesian treatment 
of the prior  information. 
It would appear  that  the authors  arrived  at these restrictions  through 
informal  Bayesianism. With respect to figure 5, they find the results 
plausible because the F column mirrors  what they think a monetary 
policy variable  ought to do to the four key macroeconomic  variables. 
This model probably  overstates the spontaneous  element of monetary 
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shares the upper-bound  character  of the triangular  results. Thus it is 
significant that the model finds almost no role for the spontaneous 
element of monetary  policy in the determination  of output. 
The next part of the paper discusses earlier work based on strong 
restrictions-shown  in the second informal  table-that  bar immediate 
effects of monetary  policy on output  or prices but do consider  feedback 
from  those variables  to monetary  policy. This work  is concerned  mainly 
with untangling  monetary  instruments  and  does not pay much attention 
to the effect of spontaneous  monetary  policy on output.  I think  it is fair 
to say that almost everything that one could learn on that issue could 
be learned  from the simple triangular  model suggested by this table, if 
there  were  just a single monetary  indicator.  In effect, one would  regress 
the indicator  on all the other  contemporaneous  innovations  and  treat  the 
residual as the spontaneous  element of monetary  policy. 
The remainder  of the paper looks at quite large models in pretty 
much  the framework  of the restrictions  of the first  informal  table. These 
restrictions  differ greatly from those in the existing literature,  because 
they exclude monetary  policy responses induced  by output  and prices. 
I am skeptical of the payoff from such complexity. Given the shaky 
basis for identification-that the Fed does not get even the smallest  hint 
about what is currently  going on in the economy-what  does one gain 
by putting  in so many indicators?  The statement  in the conclusion that 
one can be more  confident  about  the truth  of this fundamental  hypothesis 
with more variables  does not grab me. 
Nonetheless, I think the substance of the conclusion is absolutely 
right: the spontaneous  element of monetary  policy is small, and it is 
not a major  determinant  of movements  of real GDP. The paper  seems 
somewhat  out of touch with the history  of its sample  period. Those who 
believe that monetary  policy is an important  independent  driving  force 
point to episodes in the 1960s and early 1970s. There  was, after all, a 
watershed  in monetary  policy in 1979, when Paul Volcker  took over at 
the Federal  Reserve. And I have not heard  anybody  call the Greenspan 
Fed a random, independent  contributor  to fluctuations. At the same 
time, the residuals  from a Taylor rule in 1972-73 under  Arthur  Burns 
are  huge. One of the interesting  features  of the Bayesian  approach  taken 
in this paper is that it makes it practical  to study separate  VARs for 
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Ben S.  Bernanke: This is a brilliant paper that repays close study. 
Using vector autoregression  methods an order  of magnitude  more so- 
phisticated  than  those introduced  into economics by Sims in his famous 
1980 paper-but  similar  in spirit-Leeper,  Sims, and  Zha  extract  from 
the aggregate  time-series data a surprisingly  large amount  of informa- 
tion about the effects on the economy of innovations  in monetary  pol- 
icy.' The only broad  objection that one might consider making to this 
work is that in its sophistication it has departed  from the appealing 
simplicity  of the original  VAR studies  and  moved closer to the complex 
econometric  models that were the subject of Sims's original critique. 
This objection  would be largely unfair, however. First, the simple fact 
is that reality is complicated, and a useful econometric methodology 
must be able to accommodate  that fact. Second, relative to traditional 
simultaneous  equation  econometric  models, the authors'  methodology 
makes  more  exhaustive  use of the dynamic  relationships  in the data  and 
does so in the context of a full-system, rather  than an equation-by- 
equation,  estimation  technique. 
The paper  builds on and synthesizes what has become a fairly large 
VAR literature  on the effects of monetary  policy. A key insight of this 
literature is  that the traditional monetarist approach of  regressing 
changes in a macroeconomic  variable  (such as output)  on changes in a 
lagged monetary  policy measure  (such as MI growth) cannot identify 
the effects of monetary  policy. The problem  is that  policy is not exog- 
enous, but responds  to the state of the economy. Hence, for example, 
the finding  that cnanges in output  follow changes in the money supply 
cannot  distinguish  between  the hypotheses  that, on the one hand,  money 
supply changes cause changes in output, and on the other hand, both 
changes in the money supply and subsequent  changes in output are 
caused by some third  factor. 
The response  of the VAR literature  to this identification  problem  has 
been to focus on the effects of innovations-that  is, random, unanti- 
cipated  changes-in  monetary  policy. If policy innovations  are  properly 
identified, the inference that subsequent  changes in the economy are 
caused by the policy changes is valid. In practice, however, the VAR- 
based approach  has difficulties of its own. First, the identified policy 
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innovations must be truly exogenous with respect to the state of the 
economy-arising,  for example, from exogenous changes in policy 
preferences,  technical errors  in implementing  policy, or noisy contem- 
poraneous  data-not  reflections of the Federal Reserve's information 
about  current  or future  economic developments.  If what is identified  as 
a policy innovation is,  in fact, a reaction by the Fed to information 
about  the economy, not known  or accounted  for by the econometrician, 
then incorrect  inferences  will be drawn  about  the effect of policy. This 
problem presumably  underlies the liquidity puzzle and price puzzle 
phenomena  discussed both in the earlier literature  and in this paper. 
The second problem  is that, as in the earlier  monetarist  literature,  the 
results depend on an appropriate  choice of policy indicator-that  is, 
the indicator  must  be such  that  its innovations  are  due to policy changes, 
not to some other factor. If, for example, MI is chosen as the policy 
indicator,  but most statistical  innovations  in MI arise from changes in 
money demand rather  than innovations in monetary  policy, then the 
VAR-based approach  will again yield the wrong inferences. 
The technical advance  that allows the present  paper  to address  both 
of these problems is the use of Bayesian methods to save degrees of 
freedom in estimation, which, in turn, permits  the estimation  of much 
larger  systems. These larger  systems can include a longer list of infor- 
mation  variables, such as asset prices; to the extent that  the broader  set 
of variables approximately  spans the information  set used by the Fed 
to make  policy decisions, the first  type of bias noted above is mitigated. 
Larger systems also permit the inclusion of a more complete set of 
potential  policy indicators  (such as interest  rates, reserve  measures,  and 
monetary  aggregates), as well as more indicators  of economic activity 
(such as residential  construction),  which makes it possible to compare 
a variety  of alternative  identifications  of policy in the same system. The 
analysis of the robustness  of earlier VAR-based  results in the context 
of larger,  more  complete systems is the major  contribution  of the paper. 
Much  of the paper  is devoted to discussion of methodological  issues 
and to the alternative  models and identifications  that the authors  have 
tried. Because of its focus on methodology, it has relatively little to 
say on how monetary  policy works (that is, channels of transmission) 
or on how it should be used. The substantive  conclusions that I took 
away are (1) that effects of monetary  policy on the economy can be 
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qualitatively  to conventional  wisdom;  (2) that  interest  rates, such as the 
federal funds rate or the Treasury  bill rate, are better indicators of 
monetary  policy than  are  reserves  or monetary  aggregates;  (3) that  over 
the past thirty-five years monetary policy innovations have made a 
relatively small contribution  to the overall variances of  output and 
prices in the U.S.  economy; and (4) that monetary policy responds 
strongly to the economy-that  is, there is a large endogenous  compo- 
nent to policy. I do not necessarily disagree with any of these, but I 
have a few comments  on conclusions 2 and 3, as well as a few related 
remarks  about the econometrics. 
In regard  to conclusion 2, it should be said that the superiority  of 
interest  rate indicators  of policy comes as no surprise  when one consid- 
ers how central banks actually operate, not only in the United States 
but in virtually all developed countries. Currently,  almost all central 
banks smooth overnight  (or other very short-term)  interest  rates, mov- 
ing their interest rate targets only when deliberately changing their 
policy stances. This focus on interest rates in the short and medium 
runs implies that, since changes in the demand  for money or reserves 
are almost entirely accommodated  by the central  bank, innovations  in 
money or reserves typically mostly reflect demand  shocks rather  than 
policy changes. These observations  lead to two criticisms of the paper. 
First, since operating  procedures  provide  an important  clue to the choice 
of the correct policy indicator, why did the authors  not explicitly use 
more information  on operating  procedures  in the identification  of the 
model? In my work with Blinder and, particularly,  with Mihov, cited 
by the authors, I have found that explicit estimation  of Fed operating 
procedures  provides a useful way of identifying the policy indicator 
without  having to rely as much as the present  paper  does on the "rea- 
sonableness" of impulse response functions as a criterion.2  Indeed, in 
critiquing the work of some earlier authors, Leeper, Sims, and Zha 
make  informal  arguments  on the basis of what  is known  about  operating 
procedures  and the institutional structure  of the market  for bank re- 
serves; more of this type of reasoning could have been incorporated 
into the estimation. 
Further,  when one recognizes that the optimal policy indicator  de- 
pends  on the operating  procedure  and the institutional  structure,  one is 
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also forced to admit that the best policy indicator  may change over 
time. For example, Mihov and I find-in  line with conventional wis- 
dom-that  during 1979-82,  the Fed targeted  nonborrowed  reserves to 
a much greater  extent than before or since. Therefore  it would not be 
appropriate  to use the federal funds rate as a policy indicator  for that 
period. Similarly, it is often argued  that the Fed did not adopt funds 
rate  targeting  until the latter  half of the 1960s. Other  countries, such as 
Germany  and Japan,  have experienced  even more sweeping changes in 
operating procedure  and institutions over the past few decades. The 
authors'  approach  ignores the possibility of such changes by assuming 
an invariant  model-in  this application,  for the entire  period 1959-96. 
This is a shortcoming,  but one that might be overcome, for example, 
by allowing for breaks  in some subset of the model's parameters. 
With respect  to conclusion 3, my inclination  is to ask, first, is it true 
that monetary policy shocks have been unimportant  in the postwar 
period? And second, if it is true, so what? One reason why I am not 
sure that  it is true is precisely the large number  of variables  included  in 
these systems; while it is hard  to judge the number  of degrees of free- 
dom in a Bayesian setup, overfitting-and  hence an artificially  small 
estimate  of the policy residuals-seems  to be a possibility. Also, is the 
one-month-ahead  forecast  error  the right  choice of focus in judging the 
variance  of policy shocks?  It may be, for example, that  a forecast  error 
of longer horizon is the relevant one for product and labor markets, 
where nominal  contracts  (both implicit and  explicit) might well last for 
more than a month. 
And even if one agrees that monetary  policy shocks explain a small 
portion  of the variance  in output  and prices over the past thirty  years, 
this is only one of several interesting questions that might be asked 
about  postwar  U.S. monetary  policy. First, the within-sample  variance 
decompositions  say nothing  about  the potential  real effects of monetary 
policy-which  experiences like the Great  Depression and the Volcker 
disinflation  suggest are large. To use a perhaps  strained  analogy, nu- 
clear  explosions account  for approximately  0 percent  of output  variation 
in the U.S.  economy over the past thirty years, but that fact is not 
informative  about  what  would happen  if nuclear  weapons  were actually 
used. To assess the potential of monetary  policy to move output, one 
should  focus on impulse  response  functions  rather  than  variance  decom- 
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ical" innovations  in monetary  policy). Second, the result  that  monetary 
policy shocks have played a small role in output variation does not 
prove that policy was conducted well during the sample period (al- 
though a small degree of unpredictability  is a feature  of good monetary 
policy). In particular,  as is well known, this exercise says nothing  about 
the effects of anticipated  monetary policy-or,  equivalently, of the 
monetary  policy rule-on  the economy. Figuring out how to analyze 
policy rules in a framework  of this sort remains  an important  unsolved 
problem. 
Let me finish where I began, however-with  praise. This excellent 
paper  strengthens  my belief that identified  VAR methods are currently 
the best available means of measuring  the effects of monetary  policy 
changes on the economy. Explaining the detailed dynamic patterns 
found here and in related  work should be a major  objective of modern 
macroeconomic  theory. 
General discussion:  N.  Gregory Mankiw noted that there are two 
strands  of literature  examining  the behavior  of the Federal  Reserve:  one 
involves estimating  policy reaction  functions, of which identified  VARs 
are an example;  the other, started  by David and  Christina  Romer, looks 
directly at minutes of the Fed's Open Market  Committee to identify 
spontaneous shifts in monetary policy. To a large extent, these two 
strands  have ignored  each others' existence. Romer  and  Romer's paper 
suggests that every recession has been preceded by a shift in policy, 
while the VARs suggest that exogenous monetary  policy changes ex- 
plain only a small portion  of economic fluctuations.  Mankiw  wondered 
how these two views could be reconciled. Sims noted that  the Romers' 
dummy is not constructed  by looking for exogenous random  changes 
in policy, but rather  for times at which inflation  is explicitly raised as 
a concern in the Fed's meeting. This makes it a strong candidate  for 
endogeneity. Leeper noted that a study by Matthew Shapiro in fact 
indicates  the Romers' dummy  for policy shifts is endogenous. He sug- 
gested that if their dummy were used in a small VAR system in place 
of other measures  on monetary  policy, it would almost surely imply a 
price puzzle. If it were used in a larger model, such as those in the 
paper, it would be insignificant. 
James Duesenberry  welcomed the paper's contribution,  noting that 
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the effects of exogenous policy actions, given that much of policy is 
endogenous, satisfactory  answers  are still far away. He suggested that 
the authors'  approach  might  benefit  from  making  use of the information 
actually available to the Open Market  Committee  when it meets. One 
example is the time series constructed  by Steve McNeiss of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, which draws on the Fed's Green Books that 
are used in making  staff forecasts  of unemployment  and inflation  at the 
time of the meetings. Such data might allow a better identification  of 
which macroeconomic  variables  enter the Fed's reaction  function. 
Several panelists discussed the paper's heavy emphasis on identifi- 
cation of the innovations and its relative inattention  to the economic 
structure.  Duesenberry  worried that these new models paid even less 
attention to the logic  of  a priori restrictions than the old-fashioned 
macroeconometric  models. He noted that any research  needs to start 
from assumptions  and priors, but such information  is likely to be as 
valuable in specifying the economic structure  of the model as in re- 
stricting  the innovation  errors. Mankiw  found it ironic that Sims, who 
had developed the VAR methodology to diminish the extent to which 
macroeconomic  models rely on a tremendous  number  of what he had 
called incredible  identifying  assumptions  on the structure,  has, with his 
coauthors,  had to return  to making  many similar assumptions  in order 
to identify policy effects. 
Benjamin  Friedman  expressed reservations  about  prospects  for dis- 
covering the effects of the systematic component of monetary  policy 
through the lens of nonsystematic variability. The problems in this 
approach  are readily illustrated  by the authors'  own finding  of a price 
puzzle, which arises in the small VARs: a rise in interest  rates  forecasts 
a rise  in prices, exactly because the rise in interest rates is not really 
an unpredictable  event, but instead, a reaction  of the market  or the Fed 
to a forecast of future inflation  that is not captured  in the VAR. Even 
the eighteen-variable  model in the paper  is unlikely  to account  for every 
variable  that enters the Fed's forecast. If variables are left out, many 
misrepresentations  analogous  to the price  puzzle could still arise. Given 
the limited number  of observations  in any time series, merely adding 
variables eventually reduces the estimated exogenous component to 
near  zero, and  hence the estimate  will be very unreliable  for an entirely 
different  reason. This problem  is not specific to the paper, but applies 
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ever a given VAR delivers as the independent  component  of monetary 
policy in order  to identify the effects of the systematic  component. 
Duesenberry  was also concerned  with the identification  strategy  of 
the paper, which attempts  to learn how monetary  policy affects the 
economy by studying  the reactions  of the economy to small deviations 
of policy from an essentially invariant  policy reaction  function. In his 
view the big question is how the system would perform if the Fed 
followed a quite different policy rule. Duesenberry  would have pre- 
ferred  more  attention  to possible changes  in the reaction  function  during 
the sample period, and to their consequence. Robert  Gordon agreed, 
questioning  whether  it was appropriate  to treat  the period  from 1960 to 
the present, and especially 1979-82,  as a single sample. Similarly, 
Friedman  speculated  that including  data  from the 1960s contributes  to 
a finding that movements of money predict movements in real output 
(as shown in the three-variable  VAR). If there  ever was such an effect, 
his own research suggests that its influence is much smaller in the 
present  day. 
Sims emphasized a point made in the paper: although the authors 
show that unanticipated  monetary  policy changes make only a small 
contribution  to output and price variation, this is not tantamount  to 
showing that systematic policy is unimportant.  The paper does show 
that the only basis for concluding that policy is causing, rather  than 
being caused by, output and price movements  is the innovations. It is 
not enough to note that monetary  contractions  precede  recessions. The 
difficulty  in finding  large  and  significant  effects from  policy innovations 
means  uncertainty  remains  as to whether  the Fed's anti-inflation  policies 
have a large effect. 
There was considerable  disagreement  over the identifying zero re- 
strictions innovations on GDP and other production  variables, moti- 
vated by the belief that the Fed could not observe them within the 
month. Some panelists, including Gordon and Laurence  Meyer, said 
that  the data are only known with a lag and agreed  that  the restrictions 
are valid. However, George Perry argued  that the Fed could still get 
information  about  variables  within the month-even  Fed governors  go 
shopping, and some indicators,  such as car sales, are known with only 
a few days' lag. More important,  preflow  data that anticipate  the main 
output variables are available to the Fed. Housing starts anticipate 
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production and purchases. In the opposite  vein,  Friedman asked 
whether  it was appropriate  to suppose  that  the Fed could observe  move- 
ments in money (either M1 or M2) within the month, given the lags 
and  errors  in data  collection and, especially, seasonal  corrections.  Even 
the Fed's definition of money changed within the sample period, and 
this choice was influenced  by past predictive  power of money for out- 
put. Gordon  also questioned  the exclusion restrictions,  arguing  that  he 
could build a case for reversing  all of the inclusions and exclusions of 
the model. Sims responded  that it does not matter  that the excluded 
coefficients are exactly zero, but only that they be small relative to the 
other  coefficients. If they are  not relatively  small, the identification  will 
be weak and the model will not work well. 
Noting the rich praise that Alan Greenspan has received for his 
conduct of monetary  policy, Duesenberry  suggested that there is little 
evidence that the Fed has gotten much better at monetary  policy. In 
Duesenberry's view,  policy has always been accommodation  punc- 
tuated by occasional panic, though the panic may be systematic in 
reacting  to inflation  over a certain  level. That  the Fed under  Greenspan 
has not been called on to panic does not mean that it would not do so 
if the situation  arose. In many respects, the early 1960s was similar  to 
today: the Fed was trying to forestall future inflation with gradual 
preemptive  interest  rate  increases. Vietnam  ended that  experiment,  but 
the people making policy then do not seem to have been so different 
from those making  policy today. Eric M. Leeper, Christopher  A. Sims, and Tao Zha  77 
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